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As the world’s factory, China, together with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, attracts the largest amount of Foreign Direct Investment. This study focuses
on the reverse trend - the movement of Chinese enterprises out of China. Although
most transnational corporations in China are state-owned enterprises whose growth
was encouraged and favoured by the state immediately after the implementation of
economic reforms, a small number of private enterprises have succeeded in expanding
and becoming the market leaders of their respective industries. Many of these
expanded overseas after the 1990s. How did these companies grow so quickly in such
a short period of time without government support? What were their motivations for
transnationalisation? How can their success in terms of their research and
development (R&D) capabilities and their own brands be explained? This paper puts
forward private entrepreneurship as the key explanation for this.
From the sociology of entrepreneurship perspective, this project illustrates the
role of private entrepreneurship in post reform China at multiple levels. It is based on
a case study of a market leader in the motorcycle industry in China called the Lifan
Group. The findings show that although it has faced constraints, Lifan has emerged
and developed itself as a market leader through proactive and innovative strategies
that are institutionalised by the chairman into the organisation. Its developmental
strategies not only establish it as a role model for latecomers to follow, but its
breakthroughs in technological innovation also facilitate the industry to evolve. More
importantly, the active involvement of the Lifan chairman in the political arena and
social welfare has pushed forward the process of modernisation in China by
influencing regulations and policies.
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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
As the world’s factory, China, together with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, has attracted the largest amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This
study focuses on the reverse trend - the movement of Chinese enterprises out of
China. Although most transnational corporations in China are state-owned enterprises
whose growth was encouraged and favoured by the state immediately after the
implementation of economic reforms, a small number of private enterprises have
succeeded in expanding and becoming the market leaders of their respective
industries. Many of these expanded overseas after the 1990s. How did these
companies grow so quickly in such a short period of time without government
support? What were their motivations for transnationalisation? How can their success
in terms of their research and development (R&D) capabilities and their own brands
be explained? This paper puts forward private entrepreneurship as the key explanation
for this.
By adopting the sociology of entrepreneurship perspective, this project aims to
illustrate the role of private entrepreneurship in post reform China at multiple levels.
It is based on a case study of a market leader in the Chinese motorcycle industry. The
study is organised into seven chapters as follows. The first chapter introduces the
topic and research question of what is entrepreneurship and why it is important. It also
describes social, economic and industrial contexts within which Lifan group grows. In
the second chapter, through literature reviewing on main perspectives of political
economy, economic geography, and sociology of entrepreneurship, a sociological
framework of entrepreneurship will be adopted to investigate the role of private
entrepreneurship in post reform China at multiple levels. The third chapter introduces
the research method, including a set of questions to be addressed, the case selection,
2sources of data and gathering method, as well as dada analysis and triangulation in the
thesis. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapter provides detailed investigation on private
entrepreneurship at multiple levels. It shows how Lifan chairman established certain
strategies into the organization and became a role model within motorcycle industry,
as well as his influences at state level. The last chapter answers the research question
through summarising all the findings.
1.1 China Shock
Just after the government of Vietnam launched an import substitution policy to boost
the development of the local industry in the late 1990s, Japanese firms decided to
begin operations and build a production network in Vietnam with the confidence that
they could control the market as they had done in Thailand and Indonesia. However,
they failed to recognize the great potential demand for low priced Chinese
motorcycles in the local market (Fujita 2007). In 2001, “the Chinese motorcycles”
captured more than 70% of the market share of motorcycles in Vietnam (Fujita 2007),
which undermined the dominant position held by the Japanese companies in the
motorcycle industry for the first time. Although the shock did not last long and Japan
recaptured the market in 2002, under the pressure of low priced competitors, the
Japanese lead firms were forced to adjust their closed-integral sourcing patterns to
incorporate local suppliers into their production networks.
This short-term prosperity reveals the current status of the Chinese motorcycle
industry in the global arena. While the Japanese firms reorganised themselves after
the Vietnam government’s enforcement of the local content ration policy and erection
of higher trade barriers, the export of Chinese motorcycles shrank dramatically in
2003, with the exception of one private Chinese motorcycle enterprise. As the market
leader in China’s motorcycle industry, this private enterprise has been able to survive
3in the local Vietnamese market not just with a guaranteed product quality but also
with a recognizable brand name.
Both entrepreneurs and policy-makers have begun to ponder upon the
development of the industry in both developing and developed countries. How can
China’s success and subsequent defeat in the Vietnamese market be explained? What
kinds of problems have been exposed with the motorcycle industry in China? How
has this one particular private enterprise achieved superior performance in terms of its
product quality and brand name? The key explanation is private entrepreneurship
matters, and studies on these issues have not only revealed the current status of the
manufacturing sector in China, but have also helped in terms of exploring the role of
private entrepreneurship in the transition economy.
1.2 Key Research Questions
The central aim of this project is to explain the role of private entrepreneurship in
creating market leadership in an industry as well as in pursuing aggressive
transnational operations. In adopting the sociology of entrepreneurship perspective,
this study aims to analyse the role of private entrepreneurship at multiple levels in
post-reform China, based on a case study of the market leader in the motorcycle
industry.
Specifically, attempts are made to address the following questions. 1. At the state
level, how has economic reform facilitated and constrained private entrepreneurship?
In return, how does private entrepreneurship lead to further reforms? 2. At the
industry level, how have certain motorcycle enterprises in China taken advantage of
the opportunities that economic reform has created to grow extremely fast and even to
transnationalise? What is the role of private entrepreneurship in the industry as a
whole? 3. At the firm level, what kind of strategic orientation has the market leader
4adopted that is associated with its successes in terms of its R&D capabilities and its
brand name? What is the role of entrepreneurship in institutionalising such a strategic
orientation? In order to address these questions, it is necessary to introduce the
research background first.
1.3 Research background
A historical understanding of China’s economic reforms is required, as it lays the
foundation upon which China’s private enterprises have emerged and developed. A
discussion of the specific factors that provides the impetus for China’s economic
growth would also help explain the focus on outward FDIs on the part of private
enterprises. It is also crucial to understand where China’s motorcycle industry stands
and why it is worth studying.
1.3.1 China’s Economic Reform
Broadly speaking, economic reforms toward marketisation involve the privatisation of
production organisations at the micro-level and the institutionalisation of market
transactions for labour, consumer goods, capital goods, enterprise ownership rights,
finance, as well as welfare services at the macro-level (Li 2005). The process of
economic reform in China can be characterised as a gradual transition from a centrally
planned economy towards marketisation. Wu has divided China’s economic reform
process into three stages that are each made up of different reform measures and that
each have different purposes (Wu 2003). The next few sections briefly discuss each
stage in order to illustrate the history of China’s economic reforms.
51.3.1.1 Administrative Decentralisation: 1958-1978
In the 1950s, Learning to one side was the main economic strategy utilised, which
involved creating an economic system of central planning that was similar to that of
the Soviet Union. This meant that China was isolated from the West and suffered a
strategic goods embargo on its economy, leaving the Soviet Union as its sole
supporter in terms of industrial, technological and financial resources (Howe, Kueh et
al. 2003). This was a historical legacy for further technological development in China.
The Great leap forward (1958-1960) signified a noteworthy departure from the
Soviet-style system; the country began to be self-reliant on foreign trade and industry
instead of depending entirely on the Socialist bloc (Howe, Kueh et al. 2003). The
economic reforms that began in 1958 involved administrative decentralisation and the
establishment of a commune system (Wu 2003). However, these reform measures did
not change the nature of the administrative authority-based resource allocation.
Subsequently, the country encountered serious economic chaos, that included
famines, population losses and economic contractions caused by the Leap and its
aftermath (Wu 2003).
Although Zhou Enlai made a speech at the Third National People’s Congress in
1964 stating that China should take on the Four Modernisations (the modernisation of
agriculture, industry, defense, science and technology) as its long-term objective
(Howe, Kueh et al. 2003), this vision vanished when the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution took place. It did not resurface until the era of Deng Xiaoping.
61.3.1.2 Incremental Reform: 1979-1993
The changes from 1979 to 1993 can be described as incremental reform (Wu 2003),
advocated by Deng Xiaoping. The early years of incremental reform were mainly
targeted at the agricultural sector, where the commune system was replaced by the
family responsibility system, together with flourishing township and village
enterprises. Based on the initial success of the agricultural sector, the central
government decided to carry out full-scale incremental reforms targeted at the non-
state sector. Specifically, this involved the development of non-State Owned
Enterprises (Non-SOEs) to achieve economic growth, the establishment of an open-
door policy to promote export and attract foreign direct investment, and the inclusion
of experimental areas (SEZs) for reform and the opening up of the economy (Wu
2003).
As a result of these incremental reforms, China’s GDP increased dramatically
from 1978 to 1990, at an average annual growth rate of 14.6% (Wu 2003). However,
these changes were limited in terms of geography and scope. For one thing, market-
oriented growth was primarily centred around the coastal provinces of China,
especially the SEZs. In addition, economic achievements came mainly from the
development of the non-state sector, while the unreformed state sector lagged far
behind.
1.3.1.3 Full-scale Reform: 1994 onwards
Full-scale reform has as its central goal the reformation of the SOEs, with the
subsequent establishment of the relevant market institutions. Institutional reform
measures have included reforming the fiscal and tax systems, the banking system and
7the foreign exchange management system to fit a market economy, as well as
establishing a new social security system (Wu 2003). Reforms to the SOEs, which
used to be the backbone of the national economy, signify remarkable progress in
beginning to extend changes to the public sector.
Traditional SOEs make up only one unit of production under the possession and
direction of the central government. Sub-units of SOEs, such as financing, production,
appointment, distribution, sales and profits, are completely controlled by different
departments of the government (Wu 2003). Such institutional arrangements not only
discourage innovation, but also have little efficiency, if at all. In fact, reforms to SOEs
have been launched as early as the 1950s. These include measures to hand over the
SOEs from the central government to local governments, expansions to the
autonomous rights of enterprises, and the introduction of the Enterprise Contracting
System (Wu 2003). The basic principles of these measures are to increase the
enterprises’ autonomous rights and to expand the managers’ operational power in
terms of profit distribution, decisions on increasing production and introducing new
products, and decision-making over appointments. However, none of these measures
have succeeded in providing SOEs with sufficient managerial autonomy or in
encouraging the separation of government administration from enterprise
management and promoting fair competition among SOEs (Wu 2003).
It was not until 1993 that the central government decided to put the establishment
of the modern enterprise system onto the SOE’s reform agenda in the Third Plenary
Session of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC1. However, reforming the SOEs is
an uneasy process that is still under way and that has faced a series of problems. As
1 Source: http://www.xinhuanet.com/
8the accomplishment of banking and fiscal reforms has been delayed, most of the
SOEs have soft-budget constraints and are making losses all the time.
1.3.2 The Impetus for China’s Economic Growth
This chapter discusses the impetus for China’s rapid economic growth in terms of
subjects: SOEs, Private enterprises and FDI. Explanations are included as to why it is
important to focus on private enterprises and outward FDI.
1.3.2.1 The contribution of SOEs
The central aim of reforming SOEs is to make them more efficient. Although this
sector is still undergoing reforms, state owned enterprises have provided unique
contributions to China’s economic development since the institution of economic
reforms. Firstly, as a representative of the interests of the party-state and being at the
forefront of economic reform, SOEs are a significant source of industrial output. From
1978-1990, SOEs contributed to more than half of the total gross industrial output
value (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Gross industrial output value by ownership (%).
Year 1978 1980 1985 1990
SOEs 77.6 76.0 64.9 54.6
Collective enterprises 22.4 23.5 32.1 35.6
Others* 0.0 0.5 3.0 9.8
Others*: private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises.
Source: quoted from Wu 2004, The National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical, Beijing: China
Statistics Press, various years.
In addition, SOEs also constitutes a powerful engine for conducting transnational
business. Before the 1990s, there were few multinational corporations operated by
private enterprises in China. The earliest transnational businesses and operations were
9all conducted by large SOEs with the support of the government to promote exports,
seek a market share, secure the supply of raw materials and national resources, and
acquire advanced technology. This has allowed them to gain varied overseas
experiences of trade.
Moreover, SOEs were pioneers in absorbing advanced technology and
implementing R&D strategies. With direct support from the government, various
channels of technology transfer have been provided to SOEs, including imports of
industrial machinery and equipment, the purchase of patents, technology licensing and
the formation of joint ventures. The government also assisted the SOEs by facilitating
the transfer of their overcapacity and outdated technology to other developing
countries.
1.3.2.2 The emergence and growth of the private sector
The reforms got on the right track in the 1980s after the incremental reform strategy
was employed (Wu 2004). This strategy, which encourages the establishment of
market-oriented enterprises in the private sector, is key to the success of China’s
economic development.
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Table 1.2.GDP Contribution by Sectors: 1990-2001.














1990 47.7 / 18.5 / 33.8
1995 42.1 / 20.2 / 37.7
1996 40.4 / 21.3 / 38.3
1997 38.4 17.8 22.1 30.4 39.5 30.4
1998 38.9 47.8 19.3 -35.3 41.9 87.6
1999 37.4 7.1 18.4 0.4 44.2 92.5
2000 37.3 35.9 16.5 -4.6 46.2 68.7
2001 37.9 46.2 14.6 -11.6 47.5 65.4
Private sector*: the collection of rural and urban non-state and non-collective economic entities.
Source: quoted from Xu Xiaonian, 2003, “Another New Economy (Ling yi zhong xinjingji),” The National Bureau
of Statistics, China statistical yearbook; Research Department of International Finance (China) Ltd., Co., Data
from China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC).
The private sector has grown dramatically since the deepening of economic
reform. Throughout the 1990s, the non-state sector, including the collective sector and
the private sector, made up more than half of the entire nation’s GDP. Since the late
1990s, the private sector alone became the dominant contributor to China’s economic
reform. In 2001, the private sector contributed to almost half of the nation’s GDP, and
its contribution rate to economic growth ranks much higher than that of the collective
and state sectors (Table 1.2).
Table 1.3. Private enterprises with high efficiency 2001.
Type of enterprise ROAa RONAb Net maxgin Asset Turnover
The Entire 3.5 6.5 5.1 0.69
State owned 2.7 6.7 5.3 0.51
Foreign 5.1 11.3 5.5 0.92
Collective 4.9 13.5 4.3 1.13
Private 5.6 12.8 4.4 1.25
ROAa: return on asset; RONAb: return on net asset
Source: quoted from Xu Xiaonian, 2003, “Another New Economy (Ling yi zhong xinjingji),” sources: The
National Bureau of Statistics, China statistical yearbook; Research Department of International Finance
(China) Ltd., Co., Data from China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC).
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Private enterprises in China have not only exhibited better performance than the
SOEs, but their performance is also competitive with the foreign enterprises within
the private sector. As the enterprise performance indicators show (Table 1.3), the
Return on net asset (RONA) of inland private enterprises is almost twice that of
SOEs, and even exceeds that of their foreign competitors.
A cross-provincial analysis (Chen and Feng 2000) has confirmed that private and
semi-private enterprises, higher education and international trade are the main
determinants of China’s economic growth, while the presence of SOEs negatively
affects economic growth across the country.
1.3.2.3 China’s FDI: Inward and Outward
Statistical Patterns of China’s FDI: inward
China’s economic reforms can be delineated as industrialisation and
internationalisation. However, the traditional economic system cannot guarantee the
large volume of capital required for investment in industrialization; therefore the
government logically made up its mind to attract foreign investment from developed
economies starting in the late 1970s. Since then, consistent inward FDI has not only
promoted import and export, but has also brought advanced technology and
management know-how into the domestic industry. In these ways, it has laid the
foundations for outward FDI. From the 1980s, there was an increasing consensus on
the view that outward FDI and multinationals can promote China’s economic
development, thus the government officially encouraged China’s outward FDI; it
stated clearly that the motivations for this were to acquire technology, seek resources,
earn foreign currency and expand the external market (Cheng and Stough 2008). The
boom in China’s outward FDI occurred after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Trip in 1992
12
when he reaffirmed the export-oriented and FDI-led coastal development strategy.
Deng even claimed that market-oriented reform should proceed for at least 100 years2.
Based on this, the Secretary Jiang Zeming stated at the 14th National Congress of
China’s Communist Party in 1992 that “we should encourage enterprises to expand
their investment abroad and their transnational operations”3.
Although the government had opened its doors to invite foreign investment into
China in order to acquire technology transfers, in the late 1970s FDI4 was minimal
and was derived solely from Hong Kong’s small and medium-sized enterprises (Lai
2002). The “big jump” of inward FDI came from 1992 onwards, after Deng Xiaoping
made an important speech during his Southern Trip to promote the attractiveness of
inward FDI, and grew aggressively in the following years (Lai 2002). Until China has
entered the WTO, the inflow FDI had entered a new era of ascendance.
2 Cited from http://www.oklink.net/lszl/dangdai/dxp01.html.
3 Cited from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697148.htm.
4 FDI: Foreign enterprises and economic entities or individuals invest in an economy to set up foreign enterprises,
joint ventures and contractual joint ventures, or borrow foreign capital for domestic approved projects; FDI
comprises cash, entity and technological investment. (translated from the definition of FDI in the Chinese statistics
yearbook 2006)
13
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Figure 1.1. Realized Foreign Capital and Actual FDI, 1983~ 2000 (US$ 100 million).
Source: quoted from Lai 2002 Foreign Direct Investment in China: Recent Trends and Patterns. Source:
Almanac of the Chinese Economy. 1997~2000; JIR, No.2, 2001.
Regarding the provincial spread, FDI was begun in the four special economic
zones from 1979-1980, and spread on to the eastern coastal area and then all over the
country excluding Tibet (Lai 2002). However, FDI has been concentrated in the
eastern part of China. Until 2004, the number of accumulated foreign projects in the
eastern area made up 82.43% of the projects in the entire country; and the
accumulated realized foreign capital accounted for 86.25% (Guo 2006).
As for the distribution by sector, in the early reform era (1979-1986), services,
especially real estate, had been the major component of FDI; after 1986, the share of
industry, especially of manufacturing industries, increased, and began to make up the
major contribution of FDI until recently (Lai 2002).
Statistical Patterns of China’s FDI: outward
China is currently the largest Asian destination for FDI. It began to undertake
aggressive foreign direct investment outside of China in the late 1980s, when the
14
government realized the importance of FDI in terms of acquiring advanced
technological and management knowledge, expanding its market share, earning
foreign exchange, and even pushing forward industry upgrading. Therefore, the
development of China’s overseas FDI has been highly influenced by the
government’s policy.
The period from 1979-1984 marked the beginning of FDI. Overseas FDI were
restricted only in terms of import/export companies and specialised international
economic and technical corporations from the provinces and municipalities (Wu and
Chen 2001). From 1985-1991, as there was an increasing consensus on the view that
outward FDI and multinationals can promote China’s economic development, the
government officially released for the first time its Provisions Governing Control and
Approval Procedures for Opening Non-trade Enterprises Overseas, where it set out
the requirements for approval of China’s outward FDI; and clearly stated the
motivations for branching out, i.e., to acquire technology, seek resources, earn foreign
currency and expand the external market (Cheng and Stough 2008).
Figure 1.2. Actual FDI (excluding financial sector) from China, 1990-2006 (US$
100million).
Source: Statistical bulletin of China’s outward FDI, 2006
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Since the late 1990s, in order to better respond to economic globalization and to
promote international competence (Cheng and Stough 2008), China accelerated its
expansion of outward FDI. Premier Zhu Rongji even listed the “going abroad”
strategy as the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), which encouraged capable enterprises
to invest globally, be actively involved in international competition as well as to
enhance their international competitiveness (Cheng and Stough 2008).
There are two main motives for China’s aggressive step-out strategy of its
overseas FDI. Firstly, it is the result of highly domestic economic development, as
well as a response to the trend of globalisation, regionalisation and the development
of overseas markets (Wu and Chen 2001). Secondly, overseas FDI is an effective type
of effort at compensating for domestic inadequacies. Therefore, outward FDI could
possibly be divided into resource-driven FDI to secure strategic resources, market-
driven FDI to make full use of the global market, and technology-driven FDI to
acquire advanced technology and management know-how.
China’s outward FDI is spread out over 150 countries in the world, but is mainly
concentrated on its neighboring economies. In terms of the total number of projects
and accumulated investment amounts, more than half of China’s FDI has flown into
Asia. Although the major continents have experienced increasing FDI inflow from
China since 2001, the majority has gone to Asia (Cheng and Stough 2008). Hong
Kong maintains the largest amount of FDI from China, followed by Korea and the
ASEAN-5 countries (Table 1.4).
While it is reasonable to expect China to pour outward FDI into the Asia-Pacific
region, it is also important to understand why China has progressively invested in
developed countries such as Germany, the United States and Australia. In fact, China
has been making large investments in these countries since the 1980s because of their
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abundant resources and high technological skills. As the high rate of economic
development in China adds to the burden of an increasing need for natural resources,
FDI in the developed countries that have sufficient resources are the key to securing a
supply of natural resources. Meanwhile, as inward FDI has a limited role to play in
technology transfer and industry upgrading, transnational operations tend to undertake
the task of acquiring advanced technology and management skills.
Table 1.4. China’s Cumulative Approved Outward FDI by Continent, 1979-2004.
Region






Asia 4,237 51% 8,224.7 54%
Hong Kong 2,258 27% 5,298.0 35%
Macau 248 3% 217.6 1%
Japan 276 3% 117.4 1%
Korea 91 1% 1,408.5 9%
India 17 0.2% 22.8 0.1%
Middle East 169 2% 194.2 1%
ASEAN-5* 599 7% 900.3 6%
Europe 1,473 18% 1,765.1 12%
Germany 186 2% 110.7 1%
Russia 575 7% 657.0 4%
North America 1,077 13% 1,556.5 10%
United States 883 11% 1,089.3 7%
Canada 173 2% 467.3 3%
Africa 717 9% 1,357.5 9%
Zambia 21 0.3% 149.7 1%
Latin America 465 6% 1,422.3 9%
Peru 23 0.3% 202.1 1%
Oceania 353 4% 819.7 5%
Australia 256 3% 695.4 5%
Total 8,322 100% 15,145.8 100%
*The ASEAN-5 countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
Source: China Commerce Yearbook, China’s Ministry of Commerce, 2004, 2005.
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Source: quoted from Cheng, S. and R. Stough (2008). New Dimensions of Economic Globalization: Surge of
Outward Foreign Direct Investment from Asia, World Scientific Pub Co Inc.
As for the sector distribution, China’s outward FDI is highly representative of its
domestic economy and its competitive advantage (Cai 1999). Up to 2000, investment
in the service sector accounted for over 60% of China’s total FDI outflows, while the
natural resources sector constituted nearly 25%, and the manufacturing sector
accounted for approximately 15% of total FDI (Cai 1999). The high percentage of
China’s outward FDI that is related to trading shows that the government has
traditionally placed exports as the driving force of economic growth. The consistently
increasing proportion of investment into natural resources reflects the fact that
domestic resources can barely meet the demand for resources that has been brought
on by rapid economic development; meanwhile, the relative low percentage of
China’s outward FDI in the manufacturing sector indicates that “the country has not
yet to be a technology- intensive country”(Cai 1999). However, earlier outward FDI
may contribute to an infrastructure presence in the global economy for China’s
aggressive transnational operations in the manufacturing sector in later periods. In
addition, investment from the manufacturing sector continues to increase.
1.3.2.4 Why focus on private enterprises and outward FDI?
Outward FDI versus Inward FDI
Although inward FDI contributes significantly to export and economic growth, it still
causes several problems. Based on Guo’s (Guo 2006) studies, inward FDI has
weakened the R&D capabilities of inland enterprises instead of encouraging
innovation abilities. Another problem is that it has a negative influence on the
development of national brands, since well-established foreign brands with advanced
technologies can easily dominate the market. Upon realizing these problems, the
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government has begun to focus on the strategy of increasing the self-innovative
capacity of enterprises and speeded up the “going out strategy”. The average growth
rate of China’s outward FDI has become more aggressive in recent years, at 65.57%
from 1999 to 2004; the amount of FDI in 2005 even triggered 12.26 billion dollars.
Private Enterprises versus SOEs
Under the ‘going out’ strategy, the government has released some favorable policies
to relax the restrictions on private enterprises; these have thus begun to play an active
role in overseas investments. In 2003, private enterprises undertook 10% of total FDI
outflows, and became one of the most dynamic types of actors in multinational
operations.





Others*: include private enterprises, foreign invested enterprises, limited companies, enterprises from
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan.
Source: Quoted from Wu 2004. “Market Socialism” and Chinese Economic Reform. Conference paper at the IEA's
Round Table on "Market and Socialism Reconsidered".
Theoretically, a significant amount of outward FDI would be another distinctive
phenomenon in reflecting China’s economic development and reform policy that
points to the importance of research on outward FDI (Liu, Buck et al. 2005).
However, China’s outward FDI has attracted less attention than its aggressive inward
FDI. Moreover, studies on outward FDI made by private enterprises in China are even
rarer. This study aims to fill this gap with a focus on outward FDI by private
enterprises. Moreover, most operations by private enterprises are in the manufacturing
19
sector (cloth, electronics, home appliances, electrical communication), within which
electrical communication equipment accounts for a large proportion of the outward
FDI. Thus, this paper takes the motorcycle industry as an example. The case under
investigation is the market leader of the motorcycle industry in China.
1.3.3 The Motorcycle industry as an illustration
As stated above, it is important to study the outward FDI of Chinese private
enterprises, especially those in the manufacturing sector. Although there are variations
in the industry in terms of technology complexity, production systems and distribution
channels, exploring the general strengths and difficulties faced by the motorcycle
industry is highly conducive to understanding the advantages and weaknesses of
China’s manufacturing sector as a whole.
Since World War II, there has been a global shift in the motorcycle industry that
is characterized by the movement of production from America and Europe to East
Asia, with Japan being the main player. However, in the late 1970s under China’s
aggressive industrial policy, the motorcycle industry began to build its foundations
and accumulate massive experiences for future growth. During this stage, with
assistance from the government, only a few of the big SOEs were capable of entering
the new industry, directly importing mature products and technologies from
developed countries (mainly Japan) through technological cooperation and joint
ventures, and these SOEs, such as Jialing and Jianshe, subsequently monopolised the
whole market (Gu and Zhang 2006).
The motorcycle industry in China experienced prosperity throughout the 1990s in
terms of attracting a great number of entering manufacturers and a speedy increase in
product output and export, thus leading China to become the largest motorcycle
manufacturer in the world since 1993. Since the rise of the demanding domestic
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market, large entrants have rushed in to the motorcycle industry, and this has resulted
in more fierce competition. In order to survive, most of the motorcycle enterprises
have put their energy and capital into process innovation, adopting advanced
exclusive process devices to increase their output and actively expand their market
share both domestically and globally.
In the early 21st century, China’s motorcycle industry has achieved a competitive
advantage in terms of its production volume and sales. Export continued to grow
rapidly in 2000 and 2001 after the government announced a public policy called the
“going-out” strategy, to promote outward FDI. The number of Chinese motorcycle
firms has increased consistently, reaching as many as 154 in 2003, and the country
produced over 17 million out of the 35.99 million motorcycles produced in the world
in 2004, 3.9 million of which were exported overseas5. However, behind the glorious
measures of success in terms of a massive expansion in production and export since
the late 1990s, the unit price of a motorcycle has decreased each year while the cost of
raw materials and production have increased consistently. In addition, it is argued that
most of the models are imitated mainly from Japan (Ge and Fujimoto 2004), which
has caused the motorcycle industry to encounter a technological lock-in at its current
status. Thus, it is necessary to conduct a close observation and detailed investigation
of the motorcycle industry in China.
The motorcycle industry in China is characterised as a cluster-based
development. Geographically, most of the motorcycle firms are located in three
regions in China - the Guangdong, Zhejiang and Chongqing provinces, with
Chongqing being the largest in terms of the output and growth rate (Figure 1.3).
5 Source: China automotive technology & research center, 2005.
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Figure 1.3. Geographical distribution of Motorcycle Clusters in China.
In 2005, the three regions shared over 60% of domestic production (Table 1.6).
Although all three regions produce a great range of motor vehicles with small
replacement (50cc~120cc), they each have their own respective competitive
advantages. Zhejiang has dominated most of the market for scooters, while
Guangdong has produced a large proportion of medium sized motorcycles
(125cc~200cc). Chongqing generally produces all types of motorcycles but its
products are highly differentiated.
Table 1.6. The Output and Growth Rate of each Cluster.
Provinces units ( million) Rate of increase compared to 2004 Share
Chongqing 4.2 27.55% 24.7%
Zhejiang 1.8 2.41% 10.6%
Guangdong 4.6 22.5% 27.1%
Total 17 16.43% 100%
Source:Compiled from Jiangmen Daily, Issue 6445, http://www.jmnews.com.cn
The production rates of the three regions have expanded drastically since the
1990s. Nevertheless, one salient paradoxical phenomenon amidst the fast growth of
China’s manufacturing industry is that while enterprises are expanding their
production volumes in a speedy manner, the accumulation of their R&D capabilities
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lags far behind (Ge and Fujimoto 2004). As seen from the three major clusters, their
products are mainly in the range of 50cc-125cc replacements, thus product
homogeneity projects fierce competition. The case in Vietnam provides the best
example for revealing both the strengths and limitations of the status of China’s
motorcycle industry in the global market. While cluster-based development engenders
rapid growth, their competitive advantage still lies in low prices. The question is how
far can the low price advantage of the Chinese motorcycle industry go? Reality has
shown that the strategy of maintaining a low price is profitable in the short term, but
only firms with R&D capability and their own brands survive in the long run.
Nevertheless, not all the motorcycle enterprises from China have been
“defeated”. There is an exceptional case that has not only gained a certain level of
R&D capability but has also built its own brands. Moreover, the entrepreneur
involved in this exceptional case plays an active role beyond the firm. The firm’s
superior performance is not only due to the capability of individual actor but also the
proactive interaction of the actor with the social contexts. In chapter 2 through
literature review on main perspectives, the sociological framework of
entrepreneurship will be adopted to address the research questions.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Main perspectives
Some potential perspectives are proposed in this chapter to address the above
questions. Among them is the sociology of entrepreneurship perspective, which
integrates multiple levels of analysis, and this proves to be the key perspective.
2.1.1 Political Economy
Political economy is one proposed perspective for studying the interactions between
the role of the state and economic performance when the neo-classical framework is
insufficient to explain the economic dynamism of East Asia. According to neo-
classical reasoning, the free market is the key to East Asian successes; there is either
no or a minimum level of state intervention (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992) in
securing market-based resource allocation. The minimum level of state intervention in
detail includes “let the wages rise according to the market conditions, enforce strict
safety and environmental standards in order to assure the highest quality products,
sharply limit direct cooperation among industry rivals, eliminate such barriers to
competition as state monopolies or fixed prices, enforce strong domestic antitrust
policies, reject all forms of managed trade, and encourage the creation of a highly
skilled work force”(Appelbaum and Henderson 1992).
However, more recent works from the perspective of political economy have
begun to cause this perspective to gain weight over free-market theory. The main
argument is that the state plays a decisive role in setting and implementing national
goals for economic growth (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992). The collective works
of political economy have proven that state policy is the most important determinant
of the East Asian economic miracle. The governments of these economies have
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substantially engaged with and directed economic transformation6. As Oi (Oi 1995)
has stated, there is planning, but it aims to maximize competitive and comparative
advantages for manufacturers within a market economy.
Appelbaum and Henderson (1992) have identified four types of political
economy (Figure 2.1) - market rational, plan rational, market ideological and plan
ideological. Although this only describes the situation up to 1995, it is undeniable that
the development of China’s trajectory has differed from that of other East Asian
economies, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. While
rapid economic growth has also resulted from economic reforms launched by China’s
strong interventionist state, the state-led development has been largely different from
its East Asian counterparts. Before economic reforms were implemented, China was a
planned ideological political economy in which the state owned and controlled all the
economic units. The central government played a dominant role in controlling
resource allocation and investment decisions. Since the reforms have gotten off the
ground, China has increasingly abandoned central planning and moved towards
marketisation (Oi 1995). However, there has neither been political reform nor a rush
towards privatization as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, nor has there
been commitment expressed to private property as in other developmental states7(Oi
1995). The distinctive form of China’s party-state led growth (Oi 1995) has
encouraged the development of theories such as the political economy of reform or
the political economy of transition (Roland 2002), which study China as a particular
case. They have described the logic of China’s economic reforms as gradualism,
6 see detailed forms of intervention, States and development in the Asian Pacific Rim, chapter one by
Appelbaum,R.P. and J.Henderson,1992.
7 Japan and East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries
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decentralisation, and particularism (Wang 2006), which has had a long lasting impact
on China’s industrialisation and internationalisation.
Figure 2.1. Four types of Political economy as defined by Appelbaum and Henderson.
Source: Quoted from Appelbaum and Henderson, in Appelbaum RP, Henderson J. 1992. States and
development in the Asian Pacific rim. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, p21
Political economy seems to be appropriate for explaining aggressive transnational
SOEs and their contributions to economic growth since most of the policies are based
on the existing SOEs in order to maintain socialist legitimacy (Wang 2006). Direct
forms of support from the central state, such as financial and technological support,
and incentives for transnational operations, are mainly distributed to certain large
SOEs. According to Zhang (Zhang 2003), it is not a surprising finding that all the
transnational operations, mainly SOEs, are under the instruction of the central
government. The three waves of China’s transnational business are parallel to the big
changes to China’s foreign investment policies; the geographical and sector
distributions of transnational corporations are highly related to the orientation of
government policies.
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However, the real picture is more complicated in terms of private enterprises and
their transnational activities under investigation. Without a normal market
environment, such as entry constraints, unobtainable financing, court enforcement of
contracts, legal provisions for shareholding (McMillan and Woodruff 2002), and
without direct support and incentives from the government as enjoyed by the SOEs,
private enterprises need to develop alternative and innovative strategies to survive on
their own and compete with their counterparts. How have they survived and even
become market leaders within such a complex and unfavourable environment? It is
probably not sufficient to answer such questions solely from the political economy
perspective. Political economy only explains strategic behaviours in a broad
institutional context constituted by the state. From the perspective of the state, the
analyses focus on the role of the state as both enabler and constrainer. How the
government has opened up room for growth as well as how it has shaped and
constrained the development of private enterprises make up the central questions to be
addressed. However, private entrepreneurs are not only shaped by but also proactively
respond to their environment. How does the regulatory environment influence the
strategic decisions of private enterprises? What are their coping strategies? Why do
they succeed in becoming market leaders and even transnationalise? A discussion of
such specific strategic behaviours of firms is absent in the political economy
perspective. Therefore, a focus on how certain enterprises have specifically benefited
from economic reform and how they have managed to gain more strength than their
counterparts requires detailed inspection. In order to fill this gap, this study aims to
combine multiple levels of analysis, a micro-level investigation of the strategic
orientation of the firm under study, a macro-level investigation of its external
environment, as well as the ways in which they interact.
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2.1.2 Economic Geography
State-level analysis offers comparisons between countries; a comparison of the
differences from industry to industry is also required. Thus, there is a need to focus on
industry in order to be more precise in analysis.
Economic geography generally explains the collective behaviour of a certain
industry and perfectly explores the motivation of transnationalisation. One
representative example of this is that Peter Dicken (Dicken 2007) has done extensive
work on multinationals through case studies of various industries. Under the
perspective of economic geography, the motivation to transnationalise, the choice of
spatial location for each subunit of an organisation, and the consequences of
transnationalisation are explored.
As far as the motorcycle industry is concerned, analysis from economic
geography is required in order to portray the situation of the whole worldwide
industry in terms of competitive advantages and general weaknesses, so as to view
where China stands. In the history of the motorcycle industry, the production and
market were dominated by America and Europe up to the early post-war period.
Famous brands such as Harley-Davidson in America and Triumph in Britain were not
only the major forces and exporters in the global market, but also stood out as key
icons of ‘coolness’ within popular culture (Pinch and Reimer 2007).
After World War II, the production centres for motorcycles gradually shifted
from America and Europe to East Asia, with Japan as the leader, followed by
mainland China and the Southeast Asian countries. Up to the 1980s, Japan was the
dominant global producer of motorcycles, headed by the four Japanese giants -
Honda, Yamaha, Kawasaki and Suzuki, and maintained this overwhelming global
dominance in the industry for decades (Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2. Production and sale of motorcycles in eight countries: 1975-2005.
Source: Quoted from Fujita, M. (2007). "Local Firms in Latecomer Developing Countries amidst China's Rise-The
case of Vietnam's motorcycle industry.",IDE Discussion Paper. No. 97. Institue of Developing Economics,
JETRO. http://hdl.handle.net/2344/543
In actual fact, the motorcycle industry had endured a big contraction in developed
countries throughout the 1980s. As automobiles gradually replaced motorcycles, the
demand for motorcycles in these countries shifted towards high-end leisure and
sports-use models. Since the 1990s, large markets for motorcycles shifted from Japan,
France and Italy to developing countries such as China, India and Indonesia, where
low-end, low power and low cost vehicles are now in great demand for the purposes
of work and family transportation.
Global sales of motorcycles have followed the steady upward trend of
production. In 2004, over 85% of all sales of motorcycles were done in Asia. In terms
of unit sales in 2006, Asia8 accounted for 32.91 million units, Latin America for 2.75
8 Total for 11 countries: China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, etc.
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million units, Europe 2.47 million units and North America 1.85 million units (JAMA
news, 2007). Therefore, it is clear that the Asian region enjoys a dominant share of
motorcycle sales.
Regarding the high-end market, data on world production has highlighted a clear
polarisation between Japan and Europe, whereas the US, or rather, North American
countries in general have a much lower volume of production. With regard to
production on the European continent, the main producers are located in Italy, France,
Spain and Germany, with Italy in the lead (Muffatto and Panizzolo 1996). Meanwhile,
production in developing economies is dominated by Japanese firms. However, the
most recent producers from the developing economies have begun to project a new
era of competition.
By 2005, China, India and Indonesia had become the top three motorcycle
producers in the world, together accounting for 74.9% of the global supply. The rise
in output has overwhelmingly been based in Asia, which accounted for over 90% of
global supply in 2006 (Figure 2.3). Of this, the most vigorous development has been
China’s rise to become the largest motorcycle producer in the world.
Figure 2.3. Worldwide motorcycle production (unit: 10,000 motorcycles).
Source: Quoted from JAMA news, 2007 http://www.jama-english.jp/motor/2007/200707.pdf
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In the process of globalisation, sourcing patterns may vary across industries.
Unlike more globalised sourcing industries such as the apparel and electronics
industries, the motorcycle industry tends to be locally sourced. For example, the local
content ratio of major Japanese lead firms has reached 98% in Thailand and 91% in
Indonesia (Fujita 2007). As Fujita has suggested, this type of sourcing pattern in the
motorcycle industry exists for several reasons. These include sufficiently large local
markets, low entry barriers for local firms, the non-standardised nature of the product
(parts that are specifically designed to meet the road conditions, climate and consumer
preferences), and the need for closely coordinated adjustments between the parts
(Fujita 2007).
The sourcing strategy is closely related to the assembler-supplier relationship.
Profound changes are occurring in the nature of the assembler-supplier relationship in
the motorcycle industry, driven primarily by the time, price and technology/design
pressures exerted by the assemblers on suppliers (Dicken 2007). It has been argued
that the superiority of Japanese firms over their competitors in terms of quality and
price lies in their integrated mass production, the closed-integral business
architecture. Specifically, this means sticking to the in-house production of strategic
components, such as the engine and frame; procuring other parts from a few
designated suppliers that the firm has long-term relationships with rather than buying
them in the open market with short-term contracts; and having the assemblers use
custom-designed rather than universal parts for their models.
However, the China shock in Vietnam forced the Japanese lead firms to
reorganize and change their sourcing patterns. The flush of Chinese motorcycles into
the Vietnam market for the first time won out over its competitors, although they were
subsequently defeated when the Japanese manufacturers had transformed themselves,
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leaving only one Chinese enterprise there. While economic geography helps in
achieving an understanding of the historical evolution of the motorcycle industry and
the collective behaviours of transnationalisation, this perspective does not cover
extreme cases within an industry. Specifically, it explains perfectly why Chinese
motorcycle manufacturers transnationalise in certain locations and their competitive
advantages as well as disadvantages, but a detailed explanation of the behaviour of the
market leader and its role both within and beyond the industry is missing. In order to
understand the market leader, some form of organisational analysis is required in
order to observe how it has emerged as a market leader; this is where the
entrepreneurship perspective comes in.
2.1.3 The entrepreneurship perspective
Market leadership is created by entrepreneurship. It creates R&D oriented and brand
building strategies which then create market leadership.
The need to examine individual behaviours as well as the contexts within which
firms interpret and make sense of their actions is reminiscent of the theory of
entrepreneurship under the sociological perspective. This perspective does not ignore
the influences and constraints of political economy; rather, it focus on how certain
individuals respond to an unfavourable environment proactively and how they
develop alternative and innovative ways of overcoming such constraints. More
importantly, the sociological framework, which integrates multiple levels of analysis,
can best combine micro-level and macro-level investigations in explaining the role of
private entrepreneurship in transitioning China.
32
2.1.3.1 Entrepreneurship research
There is a lack of consensus on the meaning of the term “entrepreneurship”. However,
by reviewing the definitions of entrepreneurship that have surfaced since the 19th
century, it becomes clear that there is a strong link between entrepreneurship and
innovation. Most of the definitions have tended to be, to some extent, a re-working
and expansion of Schumpeter's definition of entrepreneurship, which is that of
innovation being applied in a business context (Chan 2005). Such innovation can be
perceived to be institutionalising new ideas into useful applications by combining
resources in new or unusual ways that result in improved products, technology or
services (Chan 2005). Therefore, it is not limited to product innovation, but could also
refer to process innovation, market innovation, factor innovation, or even
organisational innovation.
Moreover, there is an absence of systematic studies on entrepreneurship, which
propels the continuing search for a distinctive theory of entrepreneurship. There may
be several reasons for this. First, there are many kinds of entrepreneurs and many
kinds of new venture processes in the empirical arena (Tornikoski 1999), which
makes it difficult to identify average entrepreneurs and typical venture processes. In
addition, research on this issue always focuses on empirical studies with a rather low
level of abstraction (Tornikoski 1999). More importantly, as the research on
entrepreneurship proceeds, it goes beyond its economic origins into the realm of
psychology and sociology perspectives, which yields fruitful results but also makes
the studies fragmented and incoherent. However, despite these difficulties, there is
agreement on the multidisciplinary bases from which to conduct research on
entrepreneurship theory. Therefore, social psychology, social arrangements and
cultural studies are integrated into the entrepreneurship research (Baumol 1996). It is
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believed that theories of entrepreneurship should be grounded in psychology and
sociology if they are to have any theoretical validity (Baumol 1996).
2.1.3.2 The Sociology of entrepreneurship
Sociologists have only recently begun to make contributions to entrepreneurship
studies, and have shifted their focus from viewing entrepreneurship as a class to
centring on the sub-sectors of this discipline (Thornton 1999). A common theoretical
issue they have addressed is in calling for the use of multilevel models to link the
micro-level and macro-level aspects, in order to understand how individual behaviour
is influenced by individual factors as well as by the social structure of inter-actor
influences (Thornton 1999).
According to Thornton’s (Thornton 1999) review, the entrepreneurship literature
can be divided into two groups: the supply-side perspective and the demand-side
perceptive. Supply-side studies of entrepreneurship have focused on the
characteristics of entrepreneurs in order to specify what determines the supply of
entrepreneurship. Their central argument is that special types of individuals create
entrepreneurship, and societies need an adequate supply of these individuals because
they make up the engine for economic growth. Thus, the research question always
asks what traits and backgrounds differentiate them from other populations. This
means that individual experiences of socialisation play a determining role in the
formation of entrepreneurship. Psychologists examine the psychological traits of
entrepreneurs such as their need for achievement, locus of control, risk-taking
propensity, problem-solving style and innovativeness, leadership style, values and
socialisation experiences (Thornton 1999). Meanwhile, sociologists speculate on how
attributes of culture, social class and ethnic group (Thornton 1999) produce
entrepreneurial behaviour. In sum, the psychological, social, cultural and ethnic
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characteristics of individuals all determine differences in the rate, form and location
of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. However, this perspective has been criticized
for its singular causal logic as well as for its lack of a rigorous and appropriate
research methodology (Thornton 1999). It has been accused of placing too much
emphasis on economic activity as a function of individuals and for overlooking the
influences of external structural forces (Thornton 1999).
In contrast to the supply-side perspective, the demand-side perspective
emphasises the different contexts in which the development of entrepreneurship
occurs, since an individual cannot mobilise without infrastructure. Such studies often
examine the generation of new ventures by organisational hierarchies, the activities of
the professions, the policies of nation-states, the development of markets, and the
advent of technological changes (Thornton 1999). Recent work from the demand-side
perspective has drawn from ecological and institutional theories in organisational
sociology to claim that the availability of resources encourages founders to emerge
(Thornton 1999). However, this type of analysis has been criticised for its lack of a
theory of action, and thus for ignoring the proactive role of individuals.
The two perspectives described above are based on different assumptions and
levels of analysis. The supply-side perspective is traits-oriented, which entails the
assumption that the supply of entrepreneurship is largely bound to the psychological,
social, cultural and ethnic characteristics of individuals. These kinds of studies are all
conducted at a micro-level of investigation. In contrast, the demand-side perspective
is context-oriented, which entails the assumption that external forces such as
organisational hierarchies, the activities of the professions, the policies of nation-
states, the development of markets, and the advent of technological changes may
influence or determine entrepreneurial activities. Such studies are always conducted
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within a macro-level framework. Newer work on this topic has attempted to
contribute a framework that can find a way to link the micro-level and macro-level, as
both perspectives advance causal theories (Thornton 1999). Tornikoski (Thornton
1999) has proposed that the use of a constructivist approach in the theorising process
in entrepreneurship research can help overcome the distinction between objectivist
and subjectivist research traditions, and combine the structure/agency paradox.
Thornton (Thornton 1999) has also called for a link between the two levels of
analysis, arguing that sociological frameworks, an embeddedness perspective,
institutional and ecological theory, and multilevel models can be used to integrate the
two schools and extend their research implications.
This thesis adopts a sociological framework of entrepreneurship. Individual-level
investigation and context-level examination as well as their interactions are built into
the framework, based on the assumption that growth stems from the capability of the
actor to take advantage of the situation. Based on this perspective, the ways in which
private entrepreneurship exerts its influence on a firm may be displayed through
organisational studies. In addition, such actions and influences must be viewed within
a certain industry. Moreover, state policy exploration from the perspective of political
economy is required so as to examine how external forces influence entrepreneurial
activities, and what their strategic responses are to this. The next chapter specifically
discusses private entrepreneurship in China.
2.2 Private entrepreneurship in China
2.2.1 Definition and Characteristics
In reflecting on the literature on entrepreneurship theory discussed above, a definition
of entrepreneurship is taken from recent studies which not only signifies the recent
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trends in research but also echoes Schumpeter’s origins. Entrepreneurship is defined
(Wennekers and Thurik 1999) as the ability and willingness of individuals to perceive
and create new economic opportunities, to introduce their ideas in the marketplace in
the face of uncertainty and other obstacles by making decisions on location, form and
the use of resources and institutions.
There are three common characteristics, i.e., being proactive, risk taking and
innovativeness, that have been adopted in the literature on entrepreneurship in the
transition economy. Therefore, an entrepreneur is perceived to be an individual who is
proactive, risk taking and innovative with the ability to introduce their creative ideas
into organisational birth, growth or transformation. The term private entrepreneurship
denotes the activities and spirit of private entrepreneurs in the transition economy of
China. The reason for the denotation is firstly, that there were few private enterprises
before economic reforms were implemented, thus the entrepreneurial activities were
nearly non-existent under a centrally planned economy. Additionally, the dramatic
growth of private enterprises and a private economy have freed up the development of
entrepreneurship since 1988, so studying the activities and spirit of private
entrepreneurs could possibly account for the growth of the private sector as well as
present a full-scale picture of China’s transition economy.
Since the transition economy of China is often characterised as the process of
change from a centrally planned economy to a market oriented economy, the market
in the process of transformation is characterised as technology transfer and export
orientation. Therefore, entrepreneurs are mainly imitators of existing innovations
from industrial nations. Genuine innovations by Schumpeter in this sense only play a
subordinate role (Dolles 2003). Thus, the definition of innovation here not only means
the introduction of new products, new production methods, new organisational
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schemes, and new product-market combinations. Transcultural screening and
international searches for products and services on the part of the entrepreneurs are
also considered to be innovative behaviours (Dolles 2003). To conclude, those who
innovatively respond to their environments and upset the existing order can be
considered to be innovative.
Scholars have conducted extensive research on the personal traits of
entrepreneurs in order to explore the determinants of entrepreneurship from a micro
perspective. However, in the transition economy of China, the influences of the
external environment might be more influential in determining entrepreneurial
strategies.
2.2.2 The external environment
In order to make sense of entrepreneurial activities, it is important to explore the
contexts that are external to the entrepreneurial business within which strategic
decisions are made. This is because a single profile of the entrepreneur is bound to fail
at depicting and predicting entrepreneurship without examining the influences of
environmental factors, which are always beyond the control of an entrepreneur. A
basic premise of this study is that entrepreneurial strategy is shaped by environmental
forces, which includes the political and regulatory environment.
Economic reforms, particularly the political and regulatory environment for
private enterprises, have significant influences on the decision making of
entrepreneurs in China. It is always described as dynamism, complexity and hostility
(Tan 1996) which determine the constraints and rules for economic and market
activities. Dynamism refers to the change in environmental factors, and includes the
rate of unpredictable environmental changes and the stability of the environment. It is
believed that private entrepreneurs in China face the most dynamic external
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environment compared to any other businessmen due to their less than legitimate
status (Tan 1996). Complexity refers to the number and heterogeneity of
environmental factors that are considered in the decision making process. The
underdeveloped government, legal and financial institutions in China all lead to
environment turbulence and dysfunctional competition (Tan 1996). Private
entrepreneurs are exposed to the risks of unpredictable government policies, arbitrary
officials and markets. Finally, hostility is the level of resources available to firms
from various sources in the environment. Since a high level of control on the part of
the central government, strong bargaining power with government officials, easy
access to political privileges, and soft budgets are the key characteristics of
environmental factors that differentiate SOEs from non-SOEs (Luo, Zhou et al. 2005),
private entrepreneurs need to compete with the non-private sector for scarce resources
such as financial resources, access to real estate, import and export quotas, licenses,
and support on technology transfer or innovation.
Studies that examine the relationship between the strategic orientation of private
entrepreneurs and the political and regulatory environments have shown that
regulatory dynamism, complexity and hostility lead to strategies that are characteristic
of innovative, proactive and risk taking private entrepreneurs; however, this has
discouraged the employment of a future-oriented strategy (Tan 1996).
2.2.3 The Strategic responses of private entrepreneurs
Yet, rather than simply being constrained by external forces that are largely beyond
their control, private entrepreneurs in China have been able to consciously react to
such forces in order to enhance their position in an intended manner. They are not
only working with, but also transforming, institutions in order to establish a more
favourable set of conditions.
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In facing off with environmental complexity and dynamism, private
entrepreneurs are more concerned with their competitive advantages, which may
determine their survival and future development. Thus, they are more likely to be
customer-oriented through innovation. The innovation orientation may take several
forms, such as allocating substantial resources to R&D, developing a variety of
products that are new to the firm, quickly imitating foreign products that are for sale,
and making significant changes to existing products, as well as conducting searches of
international products, services and markets.
Along with adopting this type of innovation strategy, the research suggests that
strategic alliances are also important for private enterprises to secure resources and
influences, especially in ensuring their presence and enforcing beneficial industrial
standards. Under the pressure of hostility, networking constitutes the most significant
type of initiative that is adopted by entrepreneurs to compensate for the resource
inadequacy. They have succeeded in building a reputation, establishing a trade credit,
and reinvesting their profits to substitute for the lack of legal enforcement of
contracts, bank loans and outside equity (McMillan and Woodruff 2002). Some
studies have focused on the various ways in which private entrepreneurs engage in
networking, some have examined their political networking as a way to gain license,
entry and evade the harassment of government officials, while others have explored
their business connections through personal contacts, customers and suppliers, and
industrial and commercial associations, in order to secure available resources such as
loans, technology support or sales.
However, as suggested, environmental forces may also discourage the adoption
of a future-oriented strategy. Since there are unprotected property rights and a lack of
codified information, creating a long-term strategy may be highly risky and less
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profitable. This explains why private entrepreneurs are often reluctant to make
consistent investments in R&D during the growth of their enterprises. In fact, they
invest to gain rapid returns on their capital, emphasise liquidity and spend their
returns on their personal consumption rather than reinvesting for business expansion
(Tan 1996). However, certain entrepreneurs respond to such an uncertain environment
in innovative ways, such as through multiple-field management to reduce risks, or
even stick to product innovation and exploring the global market. Short-term oriented
behaviours could be a major reason for the practice differentiation of private
enterprises within the industry.
2.2.4 The Consequences and Influences of private entrepreneurship
The supply of goods and services and the creation of jobs are arguably the most
important welfare benefits that have been brought about by the growth of private
enterprises. Given the distortions and inefficiencies of the communist planned
economy, the old firms had to shed jobs during the transition, and new entrants were
required to pick up the slack (McMillan and Woodruff 2002). Private enterprises have
also introduced competition for the state firms and thus promote efficiency.
Moreover, the contribution of private entrepreneurs to economic growth in China has
significant implications for policy making. As McMillan and Woodruff have argued,
the survival of the transition economy is also dependent on whether the government
creates institutions that induce the development of private enterprise (McMillan and
Woodruff 2002). As such, the practices and strategies of private entrepreneurs may
even serve to push the economic reform forward.
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHOD
Most of the studies on this topic have focused on how the environment influences
entrepreneurial behaviour, while only a few have been empirical studies on the role
and influence of private entrepreneurship. Moreover, the characteristics, roles and
influences of private entrepreneurship should be viewed not only in the political
economy context, but also within certain industries. From the sociology of
entrepreneurship perspective, this thesis integrates political economy, economic
geography and organizational investigation to illustrate the role of private
entrepreneurship in post reform China at multiple levels. It is based on a case study of
the market leader in the motorcycle industry. The research objective is to illustrate a
process at work rather than to provide a generalized conclusion, and a qualitative case
study research method is thus suitable and sufficient.
3.1 A set of questions
1. At the state level, private entrepreneurship is released and affected by reforms, and
also guides further reform. How has economic reform facilitated and constrained
private entrepreneurship? In return, how does private entrepreneurship lead to further
reform policies or regulations?
2. At the industry level, private entrepreneurship on the part of the market leader
exerts a certain amount of influence. How has one motorcycle enterprise in China
taken advantage of the opportunities that economic reform has brought about to
become the market leader? In addition, how does it influence the industry?
3. At the firm level, private entrepreneurship is highly related to strategic orientation,
and the strategic orientation of being product driven and geared towards brand
building allows some enterprises to grow extremely large and to gain a competitive
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advantage. The strategic orientation of a firm from its early formation is highly related
to its long-term capabilities. What is the market leader’s strategic orientation that is
associated with its successes in terms of its R&D capabilities and its brand name? In
addition, what is the role of entrepreneurship in institutionalizing this strategic
orientation?
3.2 Case selection, credentials and access to sites
This study investigates the Chongqing Lifan Group. This is based on the observation
that certain private enterprises succeed in an unfavourable environment, manage to
accumulate wealth and grow extremely fast, while actively participating in the global
economy. The private entrepreneur plays a key role in such a process and is actively
involved in the economic, social and political spheres (Heberer 1999).
The study was conducted in the Chongqing municipality, China, where the oldest
and best equipped motorcycle cluster is located. Investigations on the development of
this cluster have been highly representative on China’s motorcycle industry. The
Lifan Group, which is the market leader, is also located in this cluster, and a detailed
investigation of the firm is required in order to meet the research objective of
understanding how and why private entrepreneurship is required in establishing a firm
with certain capabilities.
Subjects The head and director in charge of each unit (finance, sales, R&D,
production) within the Lifan Group were the main subjects with whom I conducted
interviews; the main supplier and subcontractor may have also been included in some
cases to examine the firm’s transaction pattern; friends of the head and workers in the
firm were also interviewed in order to obtain more information about the firm head’s
life story.
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Potential difficulties, limitations and advantages Initial contact was made before
I conducted my fieldwork. The firm willingly accepted my interview, and my local
contact promised to help me reach some of the directors in the firm. The only problem
was that the Chairman has a tight schedule and goes overseas frequently, so I may not
have had a chance to interview him during my scheduled period of stay. However,
after extending my stay in Chongqing, not only did I have the opportunity to
interview the chairman, but was also able to ask him to provide me with a one month
internship to work in Lifan. His approval of having me be attached to the advertising
department of Lifan for one month helped my research greatly. Firstly, it enabled me
to gain easier access to data, such as Lifan archives, management policies, statistical
reports, etc. Secondly, since the staff in this department are put in charge of writing
internal newspapers, I was able to follow them to interview various people in Lifan,
including workers, managers and technicians, and some of the interviews directly
support my argument. Finally, when I obtained the status of an “insider” in Lifan, the
staff became more willingly to talk to me about the company’s history, management
style and organization structure.
3.3 Sources of data
In order to obtain well-rounded answers to all the research questions, the analysis
must consider the historical, contemporary and specific aspects of the key issues.
Thus, multiple sources of evidence are used here to make the case study data less
prone to inaccuracies or bias. In principle, the data come from several sources.
Documentation This includes newspapers, articles, regulations, government
policies, speeches, videos or any document that is germane to the motorcycle industry
in China.
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Archival Records Company files on its sales and profit, survey data and statistics
from the industry year book, were collected to undergo secondary analysis.
Interviews I conducted interviews with the subjects mentioned above. Focused
interviews were conducted with the firm’s head, directors and major partners; open-
ended interviews were conducted with the company’s workers and friends of the
head.
Direct Observations Directly observing the products, technologies and employees
of the enterprise assisted with achieving a better understanding of the firm’s problems
and successes. Moreover, it provided additional information on the topic of study and
strengthened the accuracy and reliability of the interview data.
3.4 Data gathering
The multiple sources of data included documentation, archival records, interviews and
direct observations. Documentation and archival data were mainly collected through
internet and library searches, since the documentation and archival records are
published as non-confidential data. Data from direct observations and interviews were
collected at the fieldwork site and during my internship. I conducted interviews with
several subjects in the following sequence. First, I interviewed the local professors
and journalists who have done extensive work on the Chongqing motorcycle industry;
second, I conducted unstructured interviews with the workers of Lifan (who I visited
with on multiple occasions), as well as with colleagues of the chairman in other
associations (e.g. clerks working in the local industry association and local
government); third, I conducted structured interviews with the directors and the
chairman of Lifan.
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Table 3.1. Types of Data and Methods of Gathering.
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Multiple sources of data were gathered for this research exercise following the
suggestion from Jick (1979) that “organizational researchers can improve the
accuracy of their judgments by collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same
phenomenon”. One example is the establishment of Lifan as the market leader in
China’s motorcycle industry, which is also the key reason why I chose Lifan as the
subject of study. This finding was made on the basis of comparing three different data
sources. One source of data was interviews with Lifan staff, the second was the
media, and the third was the data collected from the industry association. As the
opinions of Lifan staff may be biased, the finding was compared with arguments
made in the media, and with industry data in terms of the export volume, brand
names, etc. In this way, the validity of the findings was ensured.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AT THE
ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL
This chapter conducts an organisational investigation of the Lifan Group in order to
observe the way in which Lifan emerged as a market leader through its various
innovation strategies. Based on the detailed investigation, it can be concluded that the
rapid growth of Lifan from a small private enterprise to one of the largest private
motorcycle manufacturers in China is highly related to its strategic orientations as
institutionalised by the entrepreneurship in Lifan. Before looking into the strategic
orientations that are associated with Lifan’s success, we first need to understand the
external environment.
4.1 The external environment for private enterprises in the
motorcycle industry
Currently, Chongqing accounts for almost 40% of total motorcycle production in
China (Sonobe, Hu et al. 2006). There are two other clusters located in Guang Dong
Province and Zhejiang Province, as noted in Chapter 1. Under China’s open policy,
the government decided to transfer the production capacity of military products to
economic products. Two SOEs, Jialing and Jianshe, that were old basements of a
mature industry in machinery (Kuang 2003) shifted their production from
ammunitions to motorcycles in the 1980s based on imported technology and
equipment from Japan (Sonobe, Hu et al. 2006). These two SOEs with manufacturing
capacity dominated the market for nearly 20 years until three private enterprises grew
considerably large and formed large groups at the end of the 1990s.
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From the 1980s to 2000, the motorcycle industry in Chongqing experienced a
massive growth in terms of the number of enterprises and total production. As Sonobe
has shown, this period was also considered to be a quantity expansion period similar
to that of Japan in the post-war period, since there was little progress in terms of
product quality (Sonobe and Otsuka 2005).
In particular, as early as in the 1990s, because of the high profits and loose
restrictions on the motorcycle industry, there was a flurry of private enterprises
entering this industry, and these private enterprises benefited from a very demanding
market and incomplete market institutions, achieving rapid growth in a very short
period of time. However, when the government launched strict rules and regulations
on the management of the motorcycle industry, a large number of enterprises were
forced out, as private entrants had mainly been conducting illegal assembling (see
interview with Zhou Shisong, an officer in the Chongqing Motorcycle association, on
29 Feb 2008). Within this context, Lifan, Zongshen and Longcin not only survived
but were also able to form large groups in early 2000 and become the major players in
China’s motorcycle industry. It is primarily because these private enterprises have
been successful at overcoming the major difficulties that they have faced and
accumulated relatively high technological capabilities that they have been able to
survive and expand.
During the 1990s, the most severe problem that private enterprises faced was a
lack of legitimised status (Tan 1996), and thus the absence of the key factors
supporting the infrastructure of new companies such as technology, credit, and the
market (Tan 1996). Although they were equipped with operation permissions, they
were not even recognised by the public, especially the State owned banks, who are the
relevant bureaucracies that control the financial and technological resources. In this
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way, compared with the SOEs that were favoured by the government, private
enterprises entering the motorcycle industry were mainly faced with a series of
constraints.
Firstly, there was often no technological support provided to the private
enterprises, as technology was only provided to the SOEs in the early 1990s.
Secondly, personal savings are far from sufficient for the purpose of procuring
equipment and technology. In addition to this, it was extremely difficult to obtain
loans as the private enterprises were not even recognised by the banks and other
financial agents, since they still lacked a legitimate status during that time period (Tan
1996). Moreover, due to the influence of the centrally-planned economic system, it
was difficult for these enterprises to recruit experienced engineers since they were all
allocated to SOEs by the government. As for marketing activities, these were almost
non-existent as SOEs monopolised the market and private enterprises were not even
publicly recognised.
Therefore, although the market environment demanded more entrants into the
motorcycle industry, the eco-political environment hindered the development of
private enterprises. Even those who succeeded in surviving were all very limited in
terms of both their operational size and manufacturing capabilities, except for Lifan,
Zongshen and Longcin. These companies grew rapidly throughout the 1990s and
emerged as the “Big 3” in Chongqing in the early 2000s. Lifan has been the most
aggressive among them and has always been identified as the leader among
Chongqing private motorcycle enterprises. Such fame is not only attributable to its
leading status in various arenas within the motorcycle industry, including the fact that
it is the only enterprise that has obtained the examination exempt qualification for its
engine product LIFAN50-200ml; it has been ranked No.1 among Private Motorcycle
49
Enterprises according to the government’s 100 Private Enterprise Ranking in 2006; it
held the highest number of patents in China’s motorcycle industry up to 2006; and the
Lifan research centre ranks first in China’s motorcycle industry9. More importantly,
as ascertained from my interview with secretary Peng (Chongqing Commission for
Science and Technology) and Zhou, Lifan’s leading status is also attributable to the
chairman’s personality and influence. He is respected and followed by other private
entrepreneurs within the Chongqing motorcycle cluster.
Thus, analysing how Lifan has developed despite these various constraints to
achieve its current leading status would help us understand the general picture of how
private motorcycle enterprises evolved throughout the 1990s. The central argument of
this project is that entrepreneurship played a key role in overcoming the obstacles
faced by non-SOEs in this early period of China’s new economic development.
Accordingly, the entrepreneurship of private enterprises is the main focus of analysis.
In comparison with entrepreneurs from SOEs, who are mainly officers elected and
appointed by the government, private entrepreneurs tend to be more proactive,
innovative and more willing to engage in risk-taking (as discussed in Chapter 1).
In the sections that follow, an introduction to the Lifan chairman and a brief
biography is first provided, in order to illustrate how his background has shaped and
influenced his personality and characteristics, which have played a major role in
establishing Lifan as a successful company. Following this, a detailed organisational
analysis is conducted of how Lifan began its operations and achieved its later
successes in terms of technological breakthroughs and massive market expansion.
9 Source: quoted from Lifan newspaper, 2005/12/15, No.100.
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4.2 Entrepreneurship in Lifan: the Founder’s Background
Prior experiences, such as the founder’s educational background, growth experiences
and earlier career opportunities have had an extensive impact on the role that the
Lifan chairman has played in terms of developing various coping strategies. As
Stephanie Chiu (Chiu and Wong 2004) has discussed, the founder’s background is
relevant to the organisation’s developmental orientations. Thus, it is necessary to
retrace the chairman’s earlier experiences in order to see how he had formed certain
characteristics and how these characteristics have advanced the foundations of the
Lifan group.
Early experiences with entrepreneurship and risk
My characters and personalities are mainly formed through my life
experiences. However, the family background and heritage also have
influenced me significantly. My parents used to be landlords, but they
built up their wealth from nothing but working hard. Much of my
entrepreneurial spirits are benefited from them. (as interviewed with
Yin Mingshan, 3 April 2008)
Yin Mingshan, the Lifan chairman, was born on 10 January, 1938, to a small landlord
family in the Fulin County of Chongqing. Soon after liberation (known as the War of
Liberation, which ended in 1949), his father died and he was deported to a barren hill
on the outskirts of the county because of his landlord class background, where he
lived a hard life with his over 50-year-old mother10. In this way, he was forced to take
on the burden of caring for both himself and his mother. In order to make a living, he
borrowed 1/2 yuan from a kind-hearted man and began to sell needles in the
countryside, procuring stock from Chongqing. The chairman has stated that this was
10 for more details, see the Lifan website, life of Yin Mingshan.
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the first profit he made in his life. While selling needles, he happened to meet another
young man who would buy eggs from the countryside and sell them in Chongqing.
The chairman decided to merge his money with the egg-seller’s in order to be able to
purchase more eggs and sell them, and the egg-seller later returned with more money
for him to buy more needles with. Within a year, he had earned dozens of yuan, an
unimaginable feat at the time for a poor child living in the countryside. He even
recalled that, “thanks to selling needle, I learned how to maneuver money and this
was not popular until recently”11. Selling needles as a way to raise the entire family is
an early example of the chairman’s entrepreneurial spirit. This propensity for
procuring sales and conducting financial activities was very rare and even looked
down upon in 1950s China. This story also provides an early example of his ability to
shift from one activity to another, for instance, from being a successful bookseller to
establishing the Hongda Research Centre.
My mother is a devout Buddhism and I can even remember the motet
she sang to me when I was very young. Even when my family became
very poor, she still didn’t forget to help others. Her diligence,
hardworking, and kindness have influenced me mostly. That is also
why she named me “Ming Shan”hoping me to understand and promote
kindness. (as interviewed with Yin Mingshan, 3 April 2008)
Upon interviewing the Lifan chairman, I ascertained that his mother has had a
great influence on his life. She is a devout Buddhist and always helps others no matter
if they are rich or poor. She named him Mingshan expecting him to be a kind man. As
the chairman recalled, her diligence, hard work and kindness have helped form some
of his key characteristics such as his propensity for hard work and his constant desire
to help others. This also represents the earliest roots of his active involvement in
11 Lifan website, life of Yin Mingshan.
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charity work and public welfare concerns. This aspect is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5.
My family background influenced me a lot; however, the life
experiences play a key role in determining my characteristics. I have
experienced too many difficulties from very young, but I love reading,
so I keep practicing self reflection on myself. I believe everything has
two sides, and you should learn how to seize every opportunity for
success. (as interviewed with Yin Mingshan, 3 April 2008)
Around 1955, the chairman went to Chongqing for study. He received a student
subsidy for his excellent grades every year, and was especially good at mathematics.
However, in 1959 when he was in the third grade of senior high school, the anti-
Right-deviation campaign12 was launched in China. Yin Mingshan was pointed out to
have made Right-deviation arguments and as a result, was kicked out of school
(Chongqing’s number one middle school). Later in 1961, based on his friendship with
a classmate who had relatives in the US, he was deemed as a counter-revolutionary
and imprisoned for almost a year. He was sent to a plastic factory (Chongqing
hecheng huagong chang) to be ‘reformed through labour’. During almost 20 years of
his life as a prisoner, he read various books for knowledge accumulation and formed a
good habit of reading deeply. Moreover, prison life turned him into a positive and
hardened man. These traits have helped him overcome various difficulties in starting
the Lifan factory in the later period of his life.
It is thus clear that the Lifan founder’s family background, educational
background, early life and work experiences as a whole have contributed greatly to
the formation of his characteristics and decision-making skills and abilities. His
12 The anti-Right-deviation campaign usually refers to the 1959-1960 campaign following the “Peng Dehuai
Incident”, where many people including Party cadres were attacked and labelled as “Right opportunists”, He, H.
(2001). Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China, East Gate Book. pp117.
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mother’s influence has turned him into a philanthropist; his prison life helped him
develop a reading habit and made him a brave and persistent person; his later work
experiences laid the technical, financial and human resource foundations for the initial
establishment of Lifan. Moreover, his entrepreneurship has played a key role in
establishing Lifan as a leading company in China’s motorcycle industry.
4.3 Private entrepreneurship in Lifan: Early foundations
The foundations of Lifan can be traced to three sources - being technology centred,
obtaining initial financing, and having talented people. These are also highly linked to
the entrepreneurial traits of the Lifan chairman.
4.3.1 Technology oriented
During his life in prison, Ying Mingshan was famous for his ability to learn quickly
and work efficiently. One example of this is that he learned how to be a latheman
within one week while others usually take three years. As he explained, “I like
reading, so I read lots of books on lathe after work, and I even write a book on the
Method and Principles of rectification on Latheman (chegong jiaozheng de fangfa he
yuanli).” Another example is that he has proved himself to be much more efficient
than other workers when repairing shoes. He can repair 150 pairs of shoes per day
while others can only complete 30 pairs. The reason for this is that he has researched
the design and modification of tools for achieving efficiency. A final example is that
he taught himself to play the piano in prison. In his words, “it is music that helped me
come through all those boring years” (as interviewed with Yin Mingshan, 3 April
2008). At the 50th year anniversary celebration ceremony of Chongqing Yi Zhong
this year, he even played several songs for his classmates.
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Although this early work has no direct connection with the motorcycle industry,
it allows us to witness the chairman’s keen interest in research and studies on
technology, which can be attributed to his reading habits. These early activities laid
the technological foundations for Lifan, as it is clear that the chairman not only knows
about technology quite well but that he is also aware of the importance of
technological improvement. This may also explain why the chairman has encouraged
R&D activities from the very beginning when he started Lifan.
4.3.2 Initial financing
In 1979 when economic reform was taking place in China, Yin Mingshan was
working in a mechanical factory and learning English part-time at Chongqing
Television University. Before long, he was selected to be an English teacher by
Chongqing Television University as a result of his excellent grades and even became
a leader in the English teaching and research team. In 1982, when the Chongqing
publishing company reopened, he became an editor there. In late 1985, he started his
own publishing company called Chongqing Chang Jiang Books and Periodics
Company (Chongqing Changjiang shukan gongsi), the earliest and biggest private
bookseller in Chongqing (minying er qudao shushang). His One Jiao series for
middle school students reached new heights in sales, with over 10 million volumes in
distribution and a net profit of 1% from each book. This was the early base of
financing the Lifan factory.
“But I cannot earn that amount of money by just being a
bookseller…... Although the publishing industry is very encouraging, it
can not grow big enough as the situation of that period is concerned(as
interviewed with Yin Mingshan, 3 April 2008)
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Yin Mingshan then made a determined decision to end his role in the publishing
industry, a move that surprised everyone at the time. With the initial accumulation of
funds from his publishing company, he started the Lifan factory as the Hongda
Automobile Fitting Research Institute with nine partners based on 200,000 yuan, and
this was the predecessor to the Lifan Group 13.
4.3.3 Talented people
One of these nine partners is the Lifan chairman’s nephew (the others are his
classmates and friends). His nephew was born in Chongqing, but later moved to
northeast China and settled down there. Before founding Lifan, he had already
worked in the chairman’s publishing company. The chairman had visited the
Heilongjiang Province (in the very north of China) three times to beg his nephew to
return to Chongqing and assist with his publishing company. As his nephew recalled,
“I have already have two children in Heilongjiang, my whole family refused back in
Chongqing…. However, I was moved by his honesty and persistence, so I promised
him to come back at the last time when he visited… and I found I didn’t make the
wrong decision, since he kept all his promises to me.” Based on my interview with the
nephew, the chairman had persisted in inviting him back not only because he was a
famous writer at the time, but also because of the nephew’s extensive networks in the
publishing industry. Moreover, he was someone the chairman could trust wholly (see
interview with the nephew, 3 May 2008).
In 1992 when Lifan began its operations, the chairman’s nephew (Li Ting Yun)
began to lead its advertising department, and assisted particularly with editing the in-
house publication and carrying out various marketing programs. The chairman’s
13 Lifan website, life of Yin Mingshan
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appreciation of his talents, trustworthiness, as well as his persistent spirit seems to
have helped greatly in attracting talented people to the compnay. This explains why
many experienced engineers have been attracted to Lifan since its formation and have
often worked there until retirement. These people have made major contributions to
the building of Lifan.
The above three sources have had a major influence on the future development of
Lifan. The chairman’s earlier experiences and technological background helped lay a
solid foundation for an innovation-oriented strategy from the very beginning, as this
allowed him to envision Lifan’s development through innovation 14 . His
entrepreneurial spirit motivated him to move into the motorcycle industry and to be
able to proactively foresee the market situation at the time. His early financial
accumulations from his publishing company provided the initial financing for starting
a Lifan factory. Finally, his appreciation of talented people and his persistent spirit
have attracted experienced engineers and marketing specialists who have gone on to
make great contributions to technological breakthroughs at Lifan as well as massive
expansions into overseas markets.
4.4 Private entrepreneurship: Innovation-Based Rapid
Development
This section discusses the leading status that Lifan obtained through its R&D based
development and aggressive market expansion. It is argued that private
entrepreneurship in Lifan has played a major role in establishing the company as a
leader in China’s motorcycle industry. Specifically, although the economic backdrop
provided room for the growth of private enterprises and the mechanism of SOEs
14 Collected from interviews and speeches published in various newspapers.
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yielded less innovative activities, the entrepreneurship in Lifan meant that it was the
first to manage technological breakthroughs and subsequently expand its market share
through its R&D and marketing strategies.
4.4.1 The first 100cc of a 4-stroke engine
Lifan did not gain public awareness until its in-house development of a 100cc 4-
stroke engine in 1994, which is considered to be the first milestone in the motorcycle
industry in China. Thereafter, Lifan began to expand its market share as well as its
market awareness through continuous technological breakthroughs.
“I will make the best engine in China……”(as interviewed with Yin
Mingshan,3 April 2008)
Figure 4.1. The Lifan Hongda Research Centre, 1994.
Source: Lifan Archives from the Lifan Library.
When Lifan began its operations under the name of the Chongqing Hongda
Automobile Fitting Research Institute with the chairman and his nine partners, he had
already made up his mind to establish Lifan as a leading company. In 1992, the day
when all the partners gathered in Ying Mingshan’s home for the first planning
meeting, Yin Mingshan claimed that he would make the best engine in China, and this
induced laughter from all his colleagues. They laughed at his words because no one
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could even dare to consider such ideas at the time. However, the boldness and risk-
taking characteristics of the Lifan chairman appear to have facilitated the birth of the
first engine. The above picture shows the earliest Lifan factory; the room beside the
door is Yin Mingshan’s home and office. The first person from the right is Ying
Mingshan, and the three people beside him are some of the partners who formed
Lifan. The first from the left is Mr. Zeng Ai Bing, Yin’s classmate from Junior High
School, and he is still working at Lifan and is in charge of the Lifan Electric Bicycle
factory in Wuxi, Jiang Su province.
“The reasons that Lifan as a private enterprise became the first to
innovate the 100cc 4-stroke engine nationwide lie in the economic
background in the 1990s on one hand, and the leadership of Lifan
chairman on the other……”(as interviewed with Secretary Peng,29
March 2008)
The 100cc 4-stroke engine is prized as an innovation in the displacement rather
than in the stroke; however, it makes a significant difference in terms of market share.
In the first half of the 1990s, most of the engine models in Jialing and Jianshe had
been introduced by Japan (Ohara 2006). Jialing and Jianshe were satisfied with the
mass production of these models that had a high profitability and this situation
remained unchanged until the late 1990s. Although Lifan’s 100cc 4-stroke engine was
mainly an imitation of the Japanese Base Model (Honda C100) with minor changes,
as a book by Ohara (Ohara 2006) has shown, the major development model for
China’s motorcycle industry is called Minor-Change-Type Development, which
includes changes to the combination of “unit parts” and changes to the “unite parts”
themselves. This reveals that Yin Mingshan successfully foresaw a potential market
for the 100cc displacement model. As stated by Secretary Peng, it was the market
insight of Yin Mingshan that facilitated Lifan’s innovative achievement; this also
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explains why it has played a deviant role from its counterparts. Although Zongshen
and Loncin have later also achieved success in innovation, they were not the initial
movers as Lifan was.
As far as the SOEs (Jianglin and Jianshe) are concerned, although they are
equipped with sufficient technological and human resources, their operating
mechanisms have hindered innovation activities because the SOEs were the sole
producers and were satisfied with their high profitability. As staff in the Chongqing
motorcycle industry recalled (see interview with Xiao Yang, 30 April), in the early
1990s dealers from all over the country came to Chongqing bringing with them cash
and bills of lading, waiting outside the Jiangling and Jianshe factories to pick up
goods, with some of them waiting months. Thus, on the one hand, there was a lack of
motivation for SOEs to innovate new products or technology due to their high
profitability; on the other, there was also a lack of entrepreneurial spirit in SOEs since
the administrators are appointed managers rather than owners.
As far as most of the private enterprises are concerned, they were mainly limited
to illegal assemblers due to incomplete market regulations and a lack of variable
resources. When they began their operations, they mainly sourced for motor parts
based on one model manufactured by Jiangling and Jianshe and conducted illegal
assembling, and although they sold them in the market at much lower prices, they still
made a lot of profit (a unit price was around 2000 RMB, while SOEs sold each unit at
around 2500 RMB). However, as discussed earlier, private enterprises were faced
with a series of constraints that left them with a lack of human resources,
technological support and financial sources, and many of them were forced out of the
market when the government tightened its regulations.
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However, Lifan was the first mover among the private enterprises to invest in
R&D. In 1994, it developed the first 100cc 4 stroke motorcycle engine, which is
considered to be a milestone in the motorcycle industry of China. Although Lifan
faced the same constraints as other private enterprises did, the chairman decided
through his insight and leadership that the company would innovate by itself. Due to
his risk taking trait and the fact that he had foreseen the situation that the government
would tighten regulations, just before limiting illegal assembling, Lifan had already
begun to conduct in-house innovation activities early on, with the chairman himself
leading a team for innovation. The financing of the first 100cc stroke engine came
from illegal assembling, which other enterprises also engaged in during the early
1990s. From 1992 to 1993, Lifan mainly conduced illegal assembling of the engine
model from Jianshe. It sourced engine parts from the open market and conducted
assembling in house, then sold them to motorcycle enterprises in the Henan and
Zhejiang provinces. There was neither technological support nor R&D capabilities in
Lifan at the time; however, since SOEs and most private enterprises were engaging in
very few innovative activities, minor changes or improvements to parts of engines
were considered as innovation and became profitable. The first 4 stroke engine was
born in this context under the organisation and leadership of Yin Mingshan. After
this, Lifan received a lot of bills of lading from all over the country, with a profit of
16 million RMB. These profits came mainly from a 80,000 set purchase order that
was delivered in 1995 by Qian Jiang group in the Zhe Jiang Province15. This situation
was aligned with the increase in income levels in China at the time. As shown in
Table 4.1, the average GDP for both the urban and rural populations in China
15 source: Lifan Archives.
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increased dramatically in the first half of 1995. Increasing incomes brought changes
to consumer behaviour and the demand for motorcycles went up accordingly.
Table 4.1. 1991-1999 Per Capita Income in China.















1991 1700.6 - - 736.8 - 1700.6
1992 2026.6 326.0 19.2 808.2 71.4 9.7
1993 2577.4 550.8 27.2 910.2 102.0 12.6
1994 3496.2 918.8 35.6 1233.5 323.3 35.5
1995 4283.0 786.8 22.5 1595.6 362.1 29.4
1996 4838.9 555.9 13.0 1927.0 331.4 20.8
1997 5160.3 321.4 6.6 2131.2 204.2 10.6
1998 5425.0 264.7 5.1 2163.6 32.4 1.5
1999 5854.0 429.0 7.9 2210.0 46.4 2.1
Soure: Quoted from Tian Qiusheng, Causes for Shinkage of Consumption demand in China since
the late 1990s, Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College, 2001 17(3).
With this profit, more capital resources could be directed towards innovation
activities, as stated by Xiao yang. The Lifan chairman spent most of this profit on
design and manufacturing dies (kaifa moju), employing experienced engineers from
SOEs, and conducting experiments. Thereafter, Yin Mingshan was determined to use
4% of all profits for R&D activities, and he established an innovation-based
development strategy within Lifan as early as 1994. This is higher than the amount
put aside by Zongshen and Loncin at the time. This has to do with the differences in
each founder’s background. According to an organizational study (Chiu and Wong
2004), there is a clear relationship between the founder’s background and the strategic
orientation of an organisation. In addition, based on the author’s interview with
Secretary Peng, the reason why Lifan has succeeded in its technological innovation
may lie in the specific characteristics of Yin Mingshan. Firstly, his early experiences
working in a factory made him well aware of the importance of innovation; secondly,
he is very good at reading and thinking, thus he has gone even further in innovation,
not only leading technological innovation within the Lifan factory but also initiating
institutional innovations. As his personal characteristics were also appreciated and
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respected by Secretary Peng and other officials, Lifan was able to obtain more
financial support from the government than other private enterprises.
Figure 4.2.16 The chairman at the Lifan factory in 1996.
In 1995, Lifan became the first company to develop the 90/100cc electronic
starter engine (see Table 4.2), which is considered to be the second milestone in the
motorcycle industry. In 1996, its in-house design of the small displacement 100cc
vertical engine, the world’s first 100cc vertical engine, became the third milestone in
China’s motorcycle industry. Following this, Lifan continued to introduce new
products and technologies into the market and expand its market share
correspondingly (shown in Table 4.2).
16Photograph collected from Lifan Library when I was an intern with Lifan.
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Table 4.2. Expansion through technological innovation: 1994-2003.
Year Innovation Breakthrough Production value Production
volume






double that of 1993.






times that of 1994.
Over 4 million
sets.






















The best quality product of this type.
1998 250ccV-type Twin-cylinder
engine
The first to innovate
in China.




The first to innovate
in China.








Signifies Lifan’s entry into the market for





design of this type.
Signifies Lifan’s entry into the high tech,
energy saving, environmentally friendly
field. Laid a good foundation for entering
the European market.














The most popular type in 2002.
2002 V-type twin-cylinder, water-
cooled, 6 valves 200cc engine
The only type
worldwide.
Granted over 20 patents.
2003 The Lifan research centre is
granted status as a ‘national
R&D centre’.
The first private
enterprise to have a
research centre at the
national level.
Source: “Lifan history”, www.lifan.com
Each breakthrough has heralded large gains in profit. The 100cc 4-stroke engine
brought in a profit of 16 million RMB, while the 100cc electronic starter engine
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brought in 15 million RMB in the last quarter of 1995 17 . Bedsides the key
technological breakthroughs, Lifan has continued to introduce three to six new engine
products into the market every year since 1994. It is not only famous for its engine
quality but also ranks number one in terms of engine variation. In 2007, the sale of
engines reached as high as 3.06 million.
Thus, it is clear that by sticking to the innovation of the key parts (engine) of the
motorcycle, Lifan has successfully built up a competitive advantage in terms of its
technological capabilities since the early 1990s. The company also recognizes the
importance of intellectual property rights and established a patent strategy as early as
in 1995, which has put it far ahead of its competitors. Thus, the group ranks number
one in terms of the possession of patent numbers among private enterprises in China
up to 200718.
Table 4.3. Patents List as of 31 December 2007.
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Patent
applied
1 3 1 5 11 44 100 161 906 1305 1025 509 591
Patent
granted
0 2 2 0 7 25 43 132 388 1050 884 862 504
17 “Lifan history”, www.lifan.com.
18 http://micq.chinamarket.com.cn
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Figure 4.3.19 Patent List for Lifan as of 31 December 2007.
As shown in Figure 4.3, Lifan has sought out intellectual property protection as
early as in 1995. The number of its patents has increased dramatically since 2001,
which is in keeping with the establishment of an intellectual property rights division
within the Lifan Group in the same year. This organisational arrangement not only
prevents its innovations from illegal imitation and thus protects its profits, but also
helps greatly in promoting the Lifan brand name. Moreover, it has protected Lifan
itself from being attacked by its Japanese counterparts. In this way, it was able to
seize the market gradually as a result of the better quality of its image and its
technological strength built on its patent strategy.
4.4.2 Financial Sources
In the early 1990s, financing was a major obstacle for private enterprises that were
attempting to conduct innovation. This was especially the case in the mid-1990s,
when the government prohibited illegal assembling. Many private enterprises were
19Compiled from Lifan Patent database in the Division of Intellectual Property rights which I had access to when I













forced out of the motorcycle industry then. Only private enterprises that had their own
production capabilities were able to survive. One of the reasons for their accumulation
of production capabilities is because they had developed certain ways of financing in-
house R&D activities.
In the 1990s in Chongqing, the development of private science and technology
enterprises was mainly supported by Chongqing Commission for Science and
Technology (Chongqing kewei) (CQCST), since at the time even the Chongqing
Administration for Industry and Commerce (Gongshang Ju) did not want to support
private enterprises, and private entrepreneurs were mostly looked down upon, not to
mention that private enterprises were not endorsed by various government
departments. The mid-1990s was also the most difficult time for Lifan’s development.
However, CQCST was the only agency that supported the private economy and
coordinated with various parties, and from 1995 to 1998, it played a significant role in
providing Lifan with financial resources.
As the Lifan chairman once said “if we do not innovate, we all will die at that
time.” However, as a private motorcycle enterprise, personal accumulations were far
from sufficient to support the company’s innovation activities. Although Lifan gained
fame and 20 million RMB from its first engine in 1994, the need for continuous R&D
investment incurred severe financial shortages. Fortunately, it obtained a lot of
support from the CQCST.
In 1995, Mr. Peng Minzhong was appointed the Secretary of CQCST, and this
event marked the beginning of government support for new industry. Peng’s major
task was to support the development of private enterprises in the field of science and
technology and to assist in transforming technological results into productivity. After
the implementation of economic reform and the opening-up policy, economic
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development became the most important agenda, and the application of science and
technology to production therefore jumped onto the front burner (dang wu zhi ji). The
major objective of CQCST at the time was to organise the activities of “private
Science and Technology enterprises”, guide them to become “self financing, self
reliance, self management” (zichou zijin, zifu yingkui, zizhu jingying) based on
scientific and technological improvements, and achieve the industrialisation of
scientific and technological results. Mr. Peng has always organised people to conduct
surveys on private enterprises, make adjustments to industry policies and promote the
development of private enterprises.
‘In 1995, although the state decided to appropriate funds to support
technology enterprises, but the Chongqing Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC) refused to provide loans to Lifan although it
was qualified to be granted based on its performance assessment. In
those period, people still have that kind of ideology with the thought
that SOEs will go bankruptcy publicly while private enterprises will
become rich privately (Guoqi lan zai guo litou, minying fu zai yaobao
shang).’ (as interviewed with Secretary Peng, 29 March 2008)
The above quote shows that although the economic reform had already taken
root, the country’s sentiments had not caught up with the reform policies. People
continued to think that SOEs operate on behalf of the state’s interests, and that even if
SOEs go bankrupt, the financial losses are in the public interest; while private
enterprises operate for personal gain and that when they make profits, the money goes
into the pockets of rich people. The reforms had begun in the late 1980s, which
showed that the central government was ready to support enterprise quite early on.
However, a gap between policy and public opinion has developed.
In 1995, Lifan faced a severe shortage of capital and was close to production
collapse (see interview with Peng). However, secretary Peng decided to help it out of
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trouble by providing one million RMB20 government funds from CQCST to Lifan
over three consecutive years - 1996, 1997 and 1998. Although the interest from this
fund was much higher than from bank loans, Yin Mingshan paid back the loan along
with interest on time every year once they were due. As Peng recalled, he decided to
help Lifan with the only fund from CQCST because he trusted and appreciated the
Lifan chairman, and also believed that Lifan would make further achievements with
these loans.
Ying Mingshan is a diligent, hard-working and credible man. He also
has good judgment. The earlier experiences, especially the imprisoned
life made him a strong minded person….thus, I decided to help him
mainly because I trust him and I appreciate his personal characters’ (as
interviewed with Secretary Peng, 29 March 2008)
4.4.3 Building the Lifan Brand in the Eyes of the Government
At the beginning of the reform, because loans solely came from the financial sector
which was controlled by the government, and at that time there was suspicion that
private enterprise as a new type of organization seen to operate only for personal gain,
it was important for private enterprises to show that it was a responsible company and
it can be trusted to use the funds carefully, so as to obtain financial support from
government. Yin Mingshan has also made the effort to build the Lifan brand in the
eyes of the government, not only through R&D activities, but also through charity
work.
In 1996, Peng even requested the central STC to appropriate 3.5milion
technology loans (keji daikuan). However, although the state approved such loans, the
20 1Million RMB in 1995 is roughly equivalent to 1.4 million RMB in 2007 by comparing the Purchasing Price
Index of Raw Material, Fuel and Power (Source: China Statistics Year Book 2008).
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Chongqing ICBC refused to provide these loans as they looked down on private
enterprises. Peng went to ICBC several times and even wrote to the bank manager to
try and persuade him to give his approval. The main reason for Peng’s success was
that Lifan was the only private enterprise at the time to be involved in various social
public welfare work. For this reason, he was able to inform ICBC that Lifan is a
private enterprise with a socialist heart. As Peng wrote, Yin Mingshan, as a private
entrepreneur, also took up social responsibilities. For instance, although 1996 was
quite a difficult year for Lifan, it still spent 100 thousand RMB in support of
education in his hometown and donated for infrastructure (building new schools and
roads) to improve the welfare of the public. This is a rare move among private
enterprises (see interview with Secretary Peng, 29 March 2008).
Peng explained that the only reason for lending Lifan the funds was that he
respected and trusted the Lifan chairman. Moreover, he believes that the Lifan
chairman is different from other private entrepreneurs not only because of his insight
and trustworthiness, but also because he plays an active role in taking social
responsibility. Even in 1996 when Lifan was suffering from severe financial
problems, the chairman insisted on making public donations to his hometown for the
construction of infrastructure.
In the most difficult time of Lifan, it is the Chongqing Science and
Technology Commission that helped and supported us. (as interviewed
with Yin Minshan, 3 April 2008)
Funds from the three consecutive years were all invested in R&D activities, and
from the late 1990s, Lifan began to use around 4% of its sales earnings for innovation




This chapter is significant in that it has shown how entrepreneurship in Lifan
institutionalised the key strategies that have made it the market leader in China’s
motorcycle industry. These strategies, which became Lifan’s foundations, include its
capacity for innovation, the ability to restructure Lifan’s operations in order to
transnationalise, and moves to increase the attractiveness of Lifan’s products through
strong marketing by linking its products to China’s emerging lifestyles. The next
chapter takes a look at how Lifan’s influence extends to the motorcycle industry.
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CHAPTER 5 PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL
5.1 Why focus on entrepreneurship at the industry level
The lead firm is considered to be the firm that controls product R&D, that has pricing
power, and that controls a relatively large market share and enjoys a dominant status
in the product chain (Guo and Sui 2008). In “The Effect of Introducing Important
Incremental Innovations on Market Share and Business Survival” (Banbury and
Mitchell 1995), the author argues that a lead firm’s quick and ongoing introduction of
important incremental product innovations (such as refinements and extensions to
established designs that result in substantial price or functional benefits to users) when
an industry evolves has a major impact on its market share expansion and thus
increases its likelihood of business survival. Innovation on the part of the market
leader not only keeps the whole industry efficient by forcing out enterprises with low
technological capabilities, but also benefits other firms within the industry as they are
then able to directly adopt the advanced technology. Therefore, lead firms represent
the overall technological strength within an industry, as well as play a lead role in the
industry’s evolution by maintaining a high pace of technological change. Furthermore,
the market leadership plays a significant role in terms of establishing long-term
subcontract systems, exploring new market channels, and initiating the use of
marketing strategies to strengthen their brand images (Tellis, Golder et al. 1996).
This chapter discusses Lifan’s position as a market leader in China’s motorcycle
industry in the 1990s. A retrospective review is first conducted of the market and the
industry situation in Chongqing during this period in order to understand the external
environment around Lifan and the ways in which it exerts its influence on them.
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5.2 The market and industry environment in Chongqing
Although Chongqing is located in the inland region, which is generally considered to
be an area that is economically lagging behind, it has become famous within China
for the motorcycle industry not only because it is the major production and export
centre for motorcycles, but also because of the massive number of private enterprises
located there.
Two big SOEs, Jialing and Jianshe, have been the dominant companies in the
Chongqing motorcycle industry for decades. Not until the early 1990s did the massive
entry of private enterprises change the organisational pattern immensely. Since then,
Chongqing has enjoyed a rapid growth rate in terms of both its economic
development and employment. According to Sonobe, Hu and Ostuka, Chongqing’s
private sector increased manufacturing employment at 11.5% annually from 2002 to
2003, even faster than the national growth rate of 9.4% in China (Sonobe, Hu et al.
2006). In 2007, the GDP growth rate of Chongqing was 15.6%, even faster than the
growth rate of the national economy (China Statistics Yearbook, 2008). Such a
dramatic growth cannot be attributed solely to the increased amount of central funding
associated with the promotion of Chongqing to a municipality in 1997, as part of the
campaign to Open Up the West, but also to the extensive entry of private enterprises
into the industry (Sonobe, Hu et al. 2006).
During the period of expansion, Chongqing lost its primary status in China’s
motorcycle industry after 1995, when the flood of low quality motorcycles hit the
SOEs badly (Sonobe, Hu et al. 2006). However, it regained its supremacy in the space
of a few years because three private enterprises grew from humble sizes into large
groups during the expansion period. Not only did they have high R&D capabilities,
with Lifan in the lead, but they also make aggressive expansions in the overseas
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market. From 2003, Chongqing began to account for almost one third of the total
motorcycle production in China (as shown in Table 5.1), and the big 3 began to
produce more than half of the total volume of Chongqing’s motorcycle
manufacturing. They are not only the major producers in the inland market, but also
the forerunners for investment abroad. Among these companies, Lifan is considered
to be the leader of the Chongqing cluster and of overseas expansion21.










China 1465.77 1475.45 302.17 106189
CQ 462.78 460.83 136.50 60700
2004
China 1718.69 1719.79 387.20 142300
CQ 562.00 566.00 153.56 66900
2005
China 1776.72 1774.51 722.66 224800
CQ 492.00 489.00 173.30 74900
2006
China 2193.41 2175.48 857.94 302417
CQ 751.00 750.00 254.75 105000
2007 China 2544.69 2546.80 816.96 407600
CQ 864.00 862.00 312.30 135600
Source: Data from the Chongqing Motorcycle Association, provided by Zhou Shisong.
As is the case in China, especially under an incomplete market environment, the
lead private enterprises are always at the forefront of overcoming various difficulties.
The first is to overcome technological shortages to consistently come up with new
innovations in the market in order to ensure business survival; the second is to
proactively transnationalise in order to avoid the saturated inland market which is
already dominated by big SOEs; the third challenge is to overcome various
governmental constraints through networking, including by forging personal ties, by
21 Li Guisheng, “The market leader of motocycle industry: Lifan versus Da Changjiang”
http://www.mtc5.com/motornew/motordf/zgmtxybz-dcjVSlf_2341/2341.html.
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entering the government, and by building alliances within or beyond the industry.
Thus, according to Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka’s (2006) statistical analysis, the engine
quality of the Big 3 in Chongqing is better than that of the SOEs, and they are able to
produce high quality motorcycles efficiently. In addition, they enjoy an advantage in
terms of their brand names, as the big 3 offer higher unit prices than other private
enterprises for the same model. Thus, their R&D capabilities are at the forefront based
on the general level of the whole industry’s technological strength; their innovative
marketing strategies, such as being the first to move into foreign markets, result in
“follow the leader behaviour”, such as in the example of their investments in
Vietnam. Moreover, they are always located at the centre of the industry network,
controlling the structure of the network and resources, and therefore, other enterprises
are highly dependent on them since they completely control the standards of suppliers
and parts.
This shows that the lead firms, or a change in the lead firms, have a major impact
on the organisation of an industry. This highlights the importance of specifically
discussing the market leadership of Lifan at the industry level.
5.3 Lifan’s influence at the industry level
5.3.1 Influence in terms of R&D: keeping the industry efficient
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the lead firm is considered to be the firm
that controls product R&D, has pricing power, enjoys a relatively high market share
and holds a dominant status in the product chain (Guo and Sui 2008). It is also argued
that when an industry evolves, the lead firms’ innovation not only has a great effect
on its market share expansion and greater likelihood of business survival, but also
allows other firms to benefit from the lead firms by adopting their advanced
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technology (Banbury and Mitchell 1995). Thus, the influence of a lead firm can be
measured as market expansion, the introduction of advanced technology that can be
directly adopted by other firms within an industry, or even keeping the high
development pace of the whole industry by cultivating the suppliers along the product
chain.
Among its major competitors, Lifan began to stick to technological innovation
and product quality, and started achieving technological breakthroughs from the mid-
1990s. On the one hand, it continually brings in high-quality low-priced products onto
the customer market, and this has been particularly beneficial for the village market;
on the other, within its transaction patter, it helps a lot of upper stream and
downstream enterprises to survive and grow. In 2001, Lifan grew to become the
market leader of the motorcycle industry, achieving the top status in terms of engine
output and sales (1.84 million sets, with sales of 3.85 billion RMB), its export volume
and the number of patents. Many of the big motorcycle enterprises including Xin
Dazhou, Qianjiang, Qingqi, Fu Shida and Gang Ri have begun buying Lifan engines22.
Moreover, it has now built up long-term relationships with its major suppliers and has
even assissted with their entry into the overseas market, such as bringing its engine
parts suppliers to the Vietnam market. In addition, it provides technological support
and training to help strengthen the suppliers’ capabilities (see interview with Director
Tan from Lifan, 26 March 2008).
5.3.2 Influences in terms of expanding overseas
“One who earns money in China is a winner, one who earns money
overseas is a hero” (quoted from Yin Mingshan)
22 News from: http://ch263.net/news/xtft/news_157_7.htm.
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When Hennart & Park analysed the factors that determine Japanese manufacturing
investment in the US (Hennart and Park 1994), they found evidence of ‘follow-the-
leader behaviour’ among firms from rival enterprise groups, if they were in a loose
oligopolistic industry. Although the authors argued that it was difficult to tell whether
this was simply due to follow-the-leader behaviour or to information diffusion, the
market leader’s decision on the location of FDI as well as their acquired knowledge of
the overseas market encouraged other capable enterprises within the industry to enter
the foreign market.
“Lifan has three treasures, innovation, export, and credibility”. (quoted
from Yin Mingshan)
Besides technological innovation and institutional innovation, market innovation
also plays an important role. As Yin Mingshan has always believed, the objective of
innovation is not to passive adapt to the market but to proactively explore new
markets; if an enterprise can foresee the market needs, the market will not be
saturated. As early as 1995, the Lifan chairman noticed that the inland market was
already saturated as there was a lack of purchasing power due to limited economic
growth, and compared with SOEs, private enterprises did not have a competitive edge
there. Therefore, he made up his mind to seek out overseas markets23, thus guiding
Lifan along the path of transnationalisation. In 1996, with the help of Secretary Peng,
a group of Chongqing private enterprises visited and studied the Vietnamese market.
Based on this trip, Yin Mingshan found it to be a very profitable market, as the
foundations of the motorcycle industry in Vietnam were weak, public transport was
undeveloped, and it had an annual volume of consumption of about 1.5 million
23 Source: interview with Yin Mingshan,3 April 2008.
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motorcycles 24 . As a result of Yin Mingshan’s untiring negotiations with the
government, Lifan became the first private enterprise in Chongqing to self-manage
import and export licenses when the government announced in 1998 that it would
begin to admit private enterprises entering the import and export business. After this,
Yin Mingshan spent two years visiting other foreign markets, including Vietnam,
South Africa, Iran and Nigeria, and began to build business networks with local
enterprises. In 1998, Lifan’s export value was 2.1 million US dollars, increasing to 8.6
million US dollars in 1999, and jumping to 51.64 million US dollars in 2000, when it
entered the list of top 500 enterprises with the largest import and export value in
China.25
Since then, more and more motorcycle producers have followed Lifan’s lead in
entering Vietnam, which has now become the first major destination for China’s
motorcycle exports, in the form of direct investments and the export of parts and
components, as seen by the massive number of motorcycles exported to Vietnam from
2000 to 2001 (Figure 5.2). In 2001, there were over 70 China brand motorcycles in
the Vietnam market.26




Figure 5.1. Lifan in Vietnam.
Figure 5.2. 27China’s Export of Motorcycles
Lifan was also the first to set up a manufacturing factory in Vietnam, in 1999. As
the Lifan chairman once said, although the company’s profit margin declined when
more and more Chinese motorcycles began to be exported to Vietnam, it was still
27 Mishima, K. (2005). "The Suppliers System of the Motorcycle Industry in Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia:
Localization, Procurement and Cost Reduction Processes." Improving Industrial Policy Formulation. Hanoi,
Vietnam: Vietnam Development Forum.
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worth making investments there because of the advantages of cheap labour and the
great market potential. Following in Lifan’s footsteps, one of the big 3, the Zongshen
Group, set up a factory in Vietnam in 2004.28
5.3.3 Influences in terms of branding
As far as China’s motorcycle industry is concerned, the major difficulties it is now
facing include a relatively low level of R&D capabilities as well as an absence of
valuable brand names. Although the motorcycle industry is stepping into a quality
improvement phase, it will soon face more fierce competition from both inland and
outside sources. From 1997 to 2002, although the total sales and exports increased
every year, the profits of the motorcycle industry declined yearly; in 2001, the
industry even suffered a severe loss of 0.74 million Yuan (see Figure 5.3 & Figure
5.4 below).
Figure 5.3. Total sales and exports in China:1997-2002.
Source: quoted from “Research report on motorcycle industry” by China international
capital corporation limited, 2003.
28 News from: http://www.lsxsun.com/news/08624510.html
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Figure 5.4. Total profits of the motorcycle industry: 1995-2002.
Source: quoted from “Research report on motorcycle industry” by China international capital
corporation limited, 2003.
China’s motorcycle industry can be mainly characterised as a volume producer,
since the motor vehicles produced are concentrated at a low capacity (mainly 50cc-
150cc) with a large manufacturing capacity. The most common strategies for market
expansion are product variety through product innovation, as well as by exploring
new export channels. However, prominent brand building is absent with the exception
of a few cases.
Lifan has also been an influential leader in China’s motorcycle industry in terms
of branding. There have not been many case studies of branding in developing
countries although there is a clear need for developing countries to focus on brand
building. Regarding brand building in the motorcycle industry, as Sonobe (Sonobe,
Hu et al. 2006) has argued, the experiences of the lead firms may be educational.
“You are valueless unless you are famous.”(quoted from Yin
Mingshan)
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Lifan has been a leader in terms of its brand value because the Lifan chairman
has consistently considered branding to be one of its key developmental strategies and
has institutionalised it within the organisation. In 2004, Lifan became the only
motorcycle enterprise to obtain a national inspection exemption certificate for one of
its engine products (LIFAN 50-200ml single-cylinder gasoline engine). In the same
year, it was named “China’s Top Brand” by the national quality inspection agency. In
2006, the brand value of Lifan was about 2.1 billion RMB, ranking it 76th in "China’s
top 100 most valued well-known brands", a title issued by the China brand research
institute. Lifan was the only private motorcycle enterprise listed in the top 100. The
only other motorcycle enterprise listed in the top 100 was the big SOE Jialing Group,
which ranked 78th, even lagging behind Lifan. In 2007, Lifan ranked 231st in the
ranking of "China’s top 500 most valued brands" issued by the World brand research
institute, with a brand value of over 2.9 billion RMB.29
Lifan’s branding strategy consists mainly of two aspects. The first is technology
branding, which involves securing high-quality products through continuing
innovation activities. As discussed in Chapter 3, an innovation-oriented development
strategy has not only allowed it to grow extremely large, but also makes its brand
name famous. When Lifan began operations in 1992, the Lifan chairman made
innovation its developmental strategy from the very beginning. According to Xinhua
Net’s interview30 with the chairman, Lifan has employed such a strategy because the
chairman realized that the inland technology of the motorcycle engine is very low and
is limited to two types (50ml and 70ml) in spite of the demanding market (other types
are mainly imported from Japan), and the chairman understood that Lifan could only
29 http://www.mogou.com/brand/1078_2/
30 Lifan's breakthrough in brand building, Xinhua Nets, 2001.
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survive by producing the model that was absent in the inland market. Up to 2001, the
company’s annual R&D expense was 4% of its sales earnings, which was the highest
level within the motorcycle industry.31 Its series of technological breakthroughs not
only made the Lifan brand well-known to inland customers, but also increased its
brand value for its guaranteed product quality.
The other aspect of Lifan’s branding strategy is lifestyle branding. It aims to
promote the brand’s image through advertising, such as organising sporting events,
producing TV shows and posters. Knowledge of the Lifan brand name in the overseas
market may also play a synergetic role in its brand building inland. Lifan has made a
great effort in its overseas brand building efforts ever since 1998, when it first gained
the right to import and export. The Vietnam market is one of the most prominent
examples of Lifan’s branding success, as a series of its marketing strategies in this
market have made Lifan well-established in Southeast Asia in terms of its brand name
and corporate image. In 2001, the Lifan football team used 500 thousand RMB to
bring in the Vietnamese football star Li Xuande. Since the Vietnamese are very fond
of football games, Mr. Li’s every move in China was reported on extensively in
various media in Vietnam. This assisted immensely in elevating the profile of the
Lifan name in Vietnam. On 31 December 2001, Lifan organised a motorcycle team to
fly across the Red River (Figure 5.5). This was not only the first successful Chinese
motorcycle flight overseas, but also served to make Lifan an even more noticeable
presence in the Southeast Asian market32.
31 Lifan's breakthrough in brand building, Xinhua Nets, 2001.
32 Chongqing Evening News, 31 Dec 2001.
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Figure 5.5. 33The Lifan Motorcycle flying across the Red River.
This innovative branding strategy through the support of sports in the Vietnam
market has been successful because it has taken into consideration the customers’
taste and the nation’s culture, as people in Vietnam are very fond of football, and the
Red River is a symbol of “Mother river” where important events occur. Such a
strategy has been adopted by other motorcycle enterprises since then. In 2002,
Longcin, one of the Big 3, organised a motorcycle team to climb Mountain Everest34.
5.4 Summary
This chapter has shown that, as a market leader in the motorcycle industry,
entrepreneurship in Lifan has extended its influence to the industry level. The high
pace of innovation employed by Lifan has forced the exit of enterprises with low
technological capacities, and Lifan’s new products have been directly adopted by
other firms, in order to keep the industry efficient. Secondly, the insight and
successful potential of overseas markets has induced follow-the-leader behaviour, and
this has enabled the motorcycle industry in China to expand its exports to the overseas
market. Furthermore, Lifan has built its brand name through various marketing
strategies, which are now copied by other enterprises within the industry.
33 http://www.china-b.com/jyzy/qygl/20090214/102275_1.html




AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Organisations are embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships
(Granovetter 1985), and they are shaped and constrained by the wider context or
environment (Scott 2001). In order to cope with these constraints, organisations need
to obtain resources including financial support, technological resources and
information, through interactions with their external environment (Pfeffer and
Salancik 2003). Studies have shown that organisations may employ different
strategies to overcome external constraints and to manoeuvre to obtain advantages,
and that these ultimately affect the flow of resources to these organisations (Pfeffer
and Salancik 2003). In terms of business firms, as Shuler (Schuler 1996) has pointed
out, one key aspect of their external environment is how they interact with the
government. The external environment, especially the government, can affect the size
and cost structure of an industry as the government is not exogenous to the market,
and therefore “firms constantly function as both economic and political actors” (cited
in Schuler 1996). Specifically, the interactions between business and government
mainly involve economic regulations or industry regulations, as well as social
regulations (Hillman, Zardkoohi et al. 1999). The government functions as the agent
of economic regulation, controlling import and export licenses, financial facilities,
prices, and so on; it also plays a significant role in affecting social norms and social
values. Based on these two aspects, extensive studies have been conducted in the vein
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) theories on business and societal
relationships, with a focus on corporate political involvement and Corporate
Philanthropy. Regarding corporate political involvement, the findings have shown a
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need for enterprises to participate in politics, and have also shown that the largest
firms or market leaders are most likely to be involved in the political process because
they are the first to be faced with challenges and difficulties, and government officials
have a desire to pay attention to them because of the important status they hold within
the industry (cited in Schuler 1996). This was the case, for instance, when the U.S.
steel industry lobbied Congress to lift import barriers in the 1980s. In terms of
corporate philanthropy, it focuses on how enterprises are involved in social welfare,
and CSR in the form of corporate philanthropy involves promoting the common good
of society (Porter and Kramer 2002).
Corporate political involvement and corporate philanthropy are very common
practices, especially during the reform era in China. During economic reforms,
compared with SOEs, the external political and regulatory environment for private
enterprises were dynamic, complex and hostile (cited in Tan, 1996). Private
enterprises lacked a legitimate status as they were not even recognised by the
government. In addition, private entrepreneurs were exposed to the risks associated
with unpredictable government policy and arbitrary officials. Furthermore, private
enterprises needed to overcome the constraint of resource scarcity, such as a shortage
of bank loans, import and export quotas, licenses and support for technological
innovation. Rather than simply being constrained by external forces, private
entrepreneurs in China have been able to consciously react to their external
environment in order to enhance their position in an intentional manner. Thus, they
not only work with, but also influence institutions in order to establish a more
favourable set of conditions. One major strategy for achieving this is through political
networking to gain legitimacy, obtain licenses or even influence policy-making; other
strategies include establishing personal contacts to compensate for resource
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inadequacies and strategic alliances to secure available resources, or building a
reputation by actively attending to social welfare (Tan 1996).
As the market leader of the motorcycle industry, the entrepreneurship of Lifan
means that it also extends its influence to the state. The Lifan chairman has actively
undertaken corporate social responsibilities (CSR) during the process of the
company’s establishment and development. This chapter explains private
entrepreneurship in Lifan at the national level in two regards. First, it investigates how
the Lifan chairman represents the interests of the motorcycle industry, the
manufacturing sector and the private economy through his political involvement.
Here, the Lifan chairman’s political involvement is seen solely as a tool for wealth
creation (Garriga and Melé 2004). Second, Lifan’s contributions to social welfare are
highlighted. Here, CSR in the form of social philanthropy refers to promoting the
common good of society (Garriga and Melé 2004).
6.1 Corporate political involvement
6.1.1 Overview of the Lifan chairman’s political positions
The instrumental theory puts forward the idea that CSR in the form of political
involvement is a way to maximise corporate financial performance (Garriga and Melé
2004). “When a firm is increasingly affected by political process, it will expand
efforts to influence this process”(Hillman, Zardkoohi et al. 1999). Such corporate
political behaviour involves obtaining access to the political process and even
influencing public policy, so as to enhance a firm’s chances of survival and
development capabilities. As discussed, although private enterprises in China have
been highly constrained by the external economic and political environment, several
private entrepreneurs in China have been able to consciously react to such forces to
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enhance their position through various means. One of the most significant strategies
employed is to compensate for their inadequate resources through political
networking (Tan 1996). In addition, according to entrepreneurship studies (Thornton
1999), such decision-making on the part of private enterprises is associated with the
individual backgrounds of entrepreneurs.
It is becoming a trend among private entrepreneurs to get involved in the
government since 2001, as the private economy continues to contribute to rapid
economic growth in China. As some mainland scholars have stated35, the political
involvement of private entrepreneurs can mainly be attributed to three reasons: the
first is that they seek positions, such as Representatives of the NPC (National People’s
Congress) and the National Commissar of the CPPC (Chinese People’s Political
Consultative), in order to seek a legitimate status and the protection of their wealth.
Secondly, their presence as “red capitalists” has provided them access to more
resources, such as licenses and loans, and establishing personal ties with the
authorities or with political leaders. Thirdly, their political involvement affords them
an arena to make claims for or speak out on behalf of their interests. To date, the
founders of the “big 3” in Chongqing have all undertaken various political positions.
However, among them, the Lifan chairman made the first move and wields the most
amount of influence, since he was the first among them to take up political positions.
Encouraged by his success, the other two of the “big 3” firms later took up political
positions as well36.
The reason for Lifan being the first to move into the political arena could be due
to two things. First, as the market leader, Lifan has been the most exposed to resource
35 See Wu Baozhi, Chen Heping and Wang Yuanqi, Problems and Suggestions regarding to private owners’
participation in governmnet, Journal of the Central institute of Socialism, 2007 Issue 1.
36 See interview with Secretary Peng,29 March 20
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shortages, and has thus been the first to encounter various constraints from the
government. Second, the background and character of Yin Mingshan have facilitated
the decision-making in terms of his active political involvement (see interview with
Secretary Peng). He clearly recognises the importance of interactions between
businesses and the political process due to his early experiences (his prison life, etc.).
As early as 1995, he had already established his presence as a private entrepreneur in
the political arena, attending the first session of the Science and Technology
Conference for private economy in Zhengzhou. He was the only private entrepreneur
to attend such an official meeting at the time. Since then, the Lifan chairman has
actively undertaken various political services, as shown below (Table 6.1),
Table 6.1.37 The Lifan chairman’s political positions since 1993.
1993 -2002 Permanent Committee Member of the Political Consultative Conference of the
Chongqing Shapingba District.
1997 to now Member and Permanent Committee Member of the first and second sessions of
the Chongqing People's Political Consultative Conference.
1998 to now Member and Permanent Committee Member of the ninth and tenth sessions of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Sep 2003 to now Vice-Chairman of the China Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program
(CSPGP).
Apr 2002 to now President of the Chongqing Federation of Industry and Commerce (CQFIC).
Jan 2003 to now Vice-President of the Chongqing Second Session of the Political Consultative
Conference.
The most important political services rendered by the Lifan chairman are his
positions in the CPPCC, CQFICA and CSPGP. In China’s political system, the
CPPCC is “an advisory body to the government, which is analogous to an advisory
legislative upper house” (Li, Meng et al. 2006). The main functions of the CPPCC are
political consultation, democratic supervision and participation in the deliberation and
administration of state affairs. As a committee member of the CPPCC, the Lifan
chairman is granted the opportunity to discuss economic, political, cultural and social
37 Compiled from Lifan Library Archives which I had access to when I was an intern with Lifan.
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issues with officials in the central government before policies are created and
implemented.
The other important position held by the Lifan chairman is his role in the All-
China Federation of Industry & Commerce (ACFIC), which was established in 1953.
ACFIC is a non-governmental chamber of commerce composed mainly of private
entrepreneurs under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The main
objective of the ACFIC is to be a channel for private entrepreneurs to communicate
with the Party on industry policies, regulations on private economy, and the
development of private enterprises38. As the president of the Chongqing Federation of
Industry and Commerce, the Lifan chairman is entitled to organise and attend forums
within the industry and with the government.
The third important position held by the Lifan chairman is in the China Society
for Promotion of the Guangcai Program (CSPGP). The China Guangcai Program was
initiated by 10 private entrepreneurs in 1994, in order to respond to and implement the
“State’s 8-7 Poverty Alleviation Program-Helping Eighty million People in Seven
Years”39. The main participants in this society are private entrepreneurs. Based on the
traditional Chinese value that rich people should come to the aid of those who are
most vulnerable (Qi 2006), it serves as a new force in undertakings for poverty
reduction in terms of investment projects; it also promotes corporate social
responsibility as participation in this program is considered to be glorious and lofty.
The Lifan chairman’s position and active participation in the Guangcai program has





6.1.2 Political Consultation through the CPPCC
The Lifan chairman was the first among private motorcycle enterprise executives to
have a political presence in Chongqing. He was the first commissary to speak at the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) after Chongqing
became a municipality in 1997. Since 1998, he has attended almost all the
conferences held by the CPPC, including other activities related to the CPPC, except
when he was ill or on overseas business. As he stated in my interview with him (3
April 2008):
“I am interested in political affairs, and I wanted to guide economic
policy makings.”
His presence in the CPPCC not only shows that private entrepreneurs are now
being recognised by the central government, but also that they have opportunities to
be involved in political consultations as well as participate in the policy-making
process. The Lifan chairman’s early political involvement reinforced the company’s
legitimate status, as well as obtained resources for it, such as promoting its corporate
image and allowing for networking with government officials. Since the CPPCC of
2001, Premier Zhu has publicly praised Yin Mingshan as “a successful private
entrepreneur” many times.40 More importantly, the chairman’s political involvement
has had an influence on the policy–making process, which may yield favourable
policy outcomes for Lifan. One example is his submission of two proposals on
reforms to the structure of the motorcycle consumer tax at the CPPCC meetings in
2004. Although his proposals were not immediately adopted, they attracted a great
deal of attention from the government. This is evidenced by the fact that officials have
40 http://news.sohu.com/20070126/n247862191.shtml
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conducted surveys and studies on the structure of the motorcycle consumer tax in
Chongqing and nationwide since then, and in 2008 adjusted the tax from 10% to 3%
for motorcycles whose engine displacements are within 250ml. This is the most
significant adjustment in consumer tax since 1994 in China’s motorcycle industry; the
result is that it has increased sales of motorcycles below 250ml placement greatly.41
6.1.3 Participation in the deliberation and administration of state affairs in
other arenas
Beside the platform of the CCPCC, the Lifan Chairman has also exerted his influence
on policies and regulations through articles published in the media and public
speeches made at economic forums. From 2002 to 2007, he published over 40 articles,
in addition to making public speeches, where he discussed extensive topics relating to
the national economy and people’s livelihoods, such as suggestions on motorcycle
industrial policy; the problems and importance of China’s manufacturing sector; the
importance of the non-state economy and its contribution to China’s economic
growth; appeals for a national brand; proposals to increase the social welfare of
peasant workers; as well as proposals on how to deal with the problem of increasing
unemployment.
Of these suggestions and opinions, one example of how he has influenced the
government’s policy is the taking up of his suggestion to urge the government to relax
regulations on private enterprises going overseas. In May 2006, Yin Mingshan
suggested relaxing the regulations on private enterprises at the “Forum of Private
Enterprises Going Overseas” co-organised by the Ministry of Commerce and ACFIC.
Not only did his suggestions receive discreet consideration, but government officials
thereafter promised to implement certain solutions to promote export, support key
41 http://www.cmwin.com/CBPResource/StageHtmlPage/A256/A2562008151926331.htm
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industries to transnationalise, simplify examination procedures, and provide a better
regulatory and legal environment for private enterprises going overseas.42
In addition, the chairman has often made speeches emphasising that the major
problems with China’s manufacturing sector are a lack of innovation and of
intellectual property rights. His words have been cited in the reports and reviews of
government officials in the State Intellectual Property Office. For example, Mr. Sun
Xiaohua cited Yin’s concerns on the declining profit margin of Chinese motorcycles
in order to illustrate the major problems with China’s manufacturing sector43. Yin’s
speeches have also been cited in the SIPO’s Intellectual Property Strategy Review
series (July 2008), where he appealed for the upgrading of China’s economic
development model. 44 The Lifan chairman also cares for the social welfare of
workers, and his opinions on how to treat employees well have been collated into a
review paper on the Issue of Employee’s Rights and Interests (Aug 2005) on the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions website.
The political involvement of private entrepreneurs since the late 1990s signifies
that the central government has confirmed the group’s legal status and now
incorporates them into the political regime. The group of entrepreneurial élites not
only brings an entrepreneurial spirit into the management and administration of state







“Private entrepreneurs should always be ready to repay society.”
(quoted from Yin Mingshan)
Corporate social responsibility, mainly in the form of corporate philanthropy, is based
on the ethical responsibility of corporations to society (Garriga and Melé 2004).
Corporations should focus on the right things to ensure that their activities have a
favourable impact in the public sphere, such as on consumers, employees and
communities (Garriga and Melé 2004). With CSR, business is aimed at the wellbeing
of society and contributes to it in various ways, such as providing employment
opportunities and making charitable contributions. Rather than being tied to social or
business objectives, the charitable contributions always reflect the personal beliefs
and values of individuals (Porter and Kramer 2002). The Lifan chairman has made
consistent charitable contributions because his personal characteristics have been
deeply influenced by his family. Most of his contributions have been made to the
communities in which he was born and grew up. This converges with the saying that
charity begins at home; give to the place where it started.
The social contribution activities of Lifan are also institutionalised within the
organisation of Lifan. There is a separate department called the labour union within
the structure of the Lifan group that is mainly in charge of its corporate social
responsibilities. This department launched the Help-Poverty Project as early as 1993.
Up to October 2006, the total amount of donations to various social services and the
Help-Poverty Projects had reached 52.50 million RMB.
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Employment
“One of the most efficient ways to repay society is to offer more job
vacancies to society”. (quoted fromYing Mingshan)
From 1992 to October 2006, Lifan created over 30 thousand job vacancies for the
public. By October 2006, the group had employed 3422 peasant workers, 1792
unemployed workers and 2529 university students. It has also created internship
opportunities and stipends for university students if they take up a contract with Lifan.
Public donations
“To help the vulnerable should be the character of entrepreneurs”.
(quoted from Ying Mingshan)
Public donations made by the Lifan group consist of two types. The first is
donations after natural disasters. For instance, 327 thousand RMB was donated to the
Changjiang river disaster area in 1998; 2.25 million RMB was donated to the
Chongqing government to counter SARS in 2003; 800 thousand RMB was donated to
the Chongqing Kai county; 1 million RMB was donated to counter Chongqing’s
drought-hit area in 2006. The other type of public donation made by Lifan is routine
donations. As discussed in Chapter 3, such activities began as early as 1995.
Donations of support in building new villages, rural libraries and other charity
donations have accumulated to 2912.52 RMB.
Intellectual investments
Lifan has helped to build schools for children in poor areas as early as 1993 across
China. In 2003, the group began to name its donating school the Lifan Glory Primary
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School and made a plan to build 100 Glory schools in the near future (Figure 6.1). By
2006, 70 schools had been built by Lifan, with an accumulated donation of 23.60
million RMB. In addition, the group donated 707.45 thousand RMB to build a library,
and provided various books and journals to the Ku District. Meanwhile, it established
scholarships (206.3 thousand RMB) for students in the Fulin Xinmiao District who
are admitted to universities. Moreover, it accumulated a donation of 292.6 thousand
RMB for children from poor families in the mountainous areas of Chongqing.
Figure 6.1.45 List of Guangcai Primary Schools provided donations by Lifan 1993-2007.
6.3 Summary
As discussed above, the Lifan chairman has participated actively in the policy-making
process by taking political positions, assuming positions in non-governmental
organisations, as well as making public speeches or publishing articles in the media.
He has also volunteered to take on various social responsibilities in terms of making
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donations, investing in projects and building schools. The chairman has even been
honoured as the “Representative of Chongqing City”.46 Thus, the entrepreneurship of
Lifan has been influential at the state level because of the chairman’s political
involvement and undertakings in corporate philanthropy. Such involvement is both
self interested and philanthropic; as it will not only bring good to the company, but
also be beneficial for Chongqing city, motorcycle industry as well as the country.
46 Chongqing Evening News, 23rd June 2009.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION
From the sociology of entrepreneurship perspective, this study has provided an
explanatory analysis of the role of private entrepreneurship at multiple levels in post-
reform China, based on a case study of the market leader of the motorcycle industry,
the Lifan Group. Specifically, at the state level, it has examined how economic reform
has facilitated and constrained private entrepreneurship, and in return, how private
entrepreneurship has exerted its influence on policy-making and led to further reforms.
At the industry level, it has showed how motorcycle enterprises in China have taken
advantage of economic reform to grow extremely fast and even to transnationalise,
and how the market leader has influenced the industry in terms of innovation,
expanding overseas and branding. At the firm level, it has been argued that
entrepreneurship plays a key role in institutionalising strategic orientations (an R&D
orientation, expanding overseas, branding) into the organisation of Lifan.
7.1 Private enterprises and private entrepreneurship in China
The private economy took off under China’s economic reform in the late 1970s; the
encouragement of market-oriented enterprises in the private sector was key to the
success of China’s economic development (Wu 2004). One of the reform criteria has
been for SOEs to retreat from certain industries in order to open up space for the
growth of the private economy, to counter the “stagnating production, obsolescing
technology, declining living standards, and labor problems” (Wank 1999). New
activities such as foreign investment and expanded private businesses are seen as
transforming the communist economic system itself (Wank 1999). As Janos Kornai
has concluded, “the rise of the private sector is the most important tendency in the
economic sphere during the process of reform” (cited in Wank 1999), since it signifies
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a major departure from the Communist order and has profound consequences for both
the economy and the polity.
Private enterprises have made major contributions to China’s economic growth. In
2001, the private sector contributed to almost half of the nation’s GDP (Xu 2003);
meanwhile, the outward FDI made by private enterprises has pushed forward China’s
industry upgrading. Their vigorous transnational activities have not only contributed
to seeking out new markets, but have also sought out cost advantages, geographical
advantages and technological advantages. In 2003, private enterprises undertook 10%
of total FDI outflows (Wu 2003) and became one of the most dynamic actors in
multinational operations. Although up to now, the major transnational corporations
are state-owned enterprises that have been encouraged and favoured by the state,
more recent studies have shown that the large-scale outward foreign investments led
by state-owned enterprises are often either confronted with a primary boycott or
encounter difficulties with examination procedures for their lack of compliance with
international business regulations. Thus, it is foreseen that in the near future, private
enterprises will play a more and more important role in the transnationalisation of
China’s economy47. As the government relaxes the restrictions on foreign investments
by private enterprises, there will be fewer differences in the favourable conditions for
SOEs and private enterprises to transnationalise. Compared to SOEs, private
enterprises have a competitive advantage in terms of their organisational flexibility,
technological capabilities in the manufacturing sector, and management philosophy.
Furthermore, private entrepreneurial activities developed during the expansion of
the private economy have a profound influence on government policies. As discussed
in Chapter 1, private entrepreneurs in China were faced with the most dynamic
47 http://www.gotoread.com/mag/1756/sarticle_7248.html
99
external environment compared to any other businessman because of their less than
legitimate status (Tan 1996). Within this context, although confronted with constraints
and an unfavourable external environment, private entrepreneurs in China have
nevertheless responded proactively and developed alternative and innovative ways of
overcoming such constraints, and have even influenced policy-making to ensure
favourable outcomes. The practices and strategies employed by private enterprises
may help push the economic reform forward.
7.2 The motorcycle industry in China in the 1990s
In the 1980s, there was a global shift in the motorcycle industry that started after
WWII, characterised by a move in production from America and Europe to East Asia,
with Japan as the main player. Since the 1990s, the large motorcycle market has
shifted from Japan, France and Italy to the developing countries, such as China, India
and Indonesia, where low-end, low power and low cost vehicles are in great demand
for the purposes of work and family transportation. In 2004, over 85% of all sales of
motorcycles were conducted in Asia.
Following the industry shift, three major motorcycle industry clusters in China
prospered throughout the 1990s as they saw a large number of entrants and a speedy
increase in product output and export, causing China to become the largest
motorcycle manufacturer in the world since 1993. The number of motorcycle firms
increased consistently, with as many as 154 in 2003, and the country produced over
17 million motorcycles out of 35.99 million in the world in 2004, 3.9 million of which
were exported overseas48.
48 China automotive technology & research center, 2005.
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However, behind the glorious story in terms of the massive expansion in
production and export since the late 1990s, the unit price of each motorcycle was
decreasing each year while the cost of raw materials and the production costs
increased consistently. In addition, it is argued that most of the models were mainly
imitations of those from Japan (Ge and Fujimoto 2004), which resulted in the
motorcycle industry encountering a technological lock-in at its current status.
However, certain private enterprises had not only gained certain R&D capabilities
but had also created their own brands. Moreover, not only were entrepreneurs in
private enterprises leading their firms to grow extremely large, but transnationalism
also began to play an active role at the industry level. This project observed the
Chongqing Cluster as it is now the most developed industry cluster with complete
supplier-assembly networks.
7.3 The history of Lifan and its influence at multiple levels
The Lifan Group in Chongqing was placed under observation in order to illustrate
how certain private enterprises succeed in an unfavourable environment, and how
private entrepreneurship has led the organisation to accumulate wealth, grow
extremely fast, and even actively participate in the global market. Private
entrepreneurship in Lifan has played a key role in establishing the group as the market
leader of the motorcycle industry in China, as well as extend its influence to the
economic, social and political spheres.
Lifan was founded by its chairman Yin Mingshan in 1992 as a Honda
Automobile Fitting Research Institute with nine partners based on 200,000 yuan. The
initial financing of Lifan came from the chairman’s previous publishing business. As
with other private enterprises, it developed by conducting illegal assembly in the early
1990s. However, the chairman institutionalised an R&D-centred development strategy
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as early as in 1994 into the organisation, followed by innovative marketing and
branding activities. In the late 1990s, the company became the leading exporter to the
Vietnamese market, and even undermined the dominant status of the Japanese
motorcycle majors there. The company has been seen to be the market leader of the
motorcycle industry in China since the late 1990s.
Although Lifan may not be as important as the large MNCs now, it certainly
played an important role during the period from 1995 to 2005. From the mid-1990s to
early 2000, the economic reform took a further step forward, as licensed private
businesses were allowed to enter the manufacturing sector as the myriad policy
restrictions against them were reduced to permit incorporated and limited-liability
private companies. These firms can now engage in capital-intensive manufacturing
and service ventures, and can sell wholesale to public producers (Cited in Wank,
1999). In this context, Lifan has emerged and developed as a market leader through
proactive and innovative strategies that were institutionalised by its chairman. Its
developmental strategies have not only set itself up as a role model for latecomers to
be modeled upon, but its breakthroughs in technological innovation have also
facilitated the growth of other firms within the industry. More importantly, the active
involvement of the Lifan chairman in the political arena has pushed forward the
process of modernisation in China by influencing government regulations and
policies.
However, as this study has centered on Lifan as a role model in terms of its
technological innovation and brand building in China’s motorcycle industry, certain
‘unsuccessful’ faces in the history of Lifan have not been discussed. For example, in
the early of 1990s, in early 2000s, Lifan had invested in other industries including
media, real estate, wine production and even mineral water production. Due to
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inadequacy of capital, human resources, and relevant experiences, it had withdrawn
from these industries by 2005. In contrary, Longcin, another one of the “Big 3”, has
entered real estate industry since 2002, and achieved the status of top 3 in Chongqing
real estate industry, and ranked No.49 of “The top 100 real estate enterprises”
published by Development research center of the state council in 2010 (Chongqing
Wanbao, 1 April 2010). in addition, Lifan has been to be public listed since 2005 for
financing purpose as it planned to upgrade into automobile industry, however, the
proposal has not been realised successfully as the failure of the family-owned
enterprise to restructure itself to meet the listing requirements. However, the third of
the “Big 3”, Zongshen have already owned two subsidiaries being listed in China and
Canada separately. As shown from above, Longcin and Zongshen have also gained
their strength in terms of reforming enterprise and expanding into other industry. Such
limitation is mainly a result of case study on the entrepreneurship in Lifan.
7.4 Outlook
From the sociology of entrepreneurship perspective, based on a case study of the
Lifan Group, the market leader in China’s motorcycle industry, this project has
demonstrated the role of private entrepreneurship in post reform China at the
organisational, industry and state levels. To conclude, the private entrepreneurship of
Lifan, its particular strategies has to be analysed within the historical context of the
1990s to mid 2000, and within this context, this particular form of entrepreneurship
has played a key role in the transition economy of China. It has contributed to provide
consumer goods, services and jobs to society; it has introduced competition into the
communist economy to promote efficiency; moreover, private entrepreneurs have
been making effort for policy-making implications, since these enterprises are at the
frontline of pushing forward the economic reform.
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This thesis has thus offered an explanatory analysis on China’s economic growth
by focusing on private entrepreneurship. It has also helped to examine the structural
features of China’s transition economy in which private business has developed and
entrepreneurship has been shaped, as well as the influences that private entrepreneurs
have exerted on China’s economic, political and social spheres. The integrative
framework facilitated an exploration of both the determinants of private
entrepreneurship and the consequences of this entrepreneurship, which has served to
enrich the study of entrepreneurship theory.
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